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NOTES

EFFECTS OF LEGAL ETHICS IN THE
BUSINESS WORLD
VERITA GULATI*

HISTORY OF THE RELATIONSHIP

Traditionally one law firm representing one organization for all
its legal needs constituted the attorney-client relationship in the
business world.I The legal ethics code adequately protected this
simple relationship and thus achieved its goal of client protection.2 However, changes in business interactions, globalization
Candidate for J.D., St. John's University School of Law, June 2003.
1 See Burton Lehman, Business Forum:An End to Congeniality; When the Law Becomes Big Business, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1989, § 3 at 3 (lamenting the shift towards increased specialization); see also Robert L. Nelson, Practice and Privileges:Social Change
and the Structure of Large Law Firms, AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 95, 97, 109 & 133 (1981)
(describing the dramatic shifts in attorney representation and firm size). See generally
ANDREW L. KAUFMAN & DAVID B. WILKINS, PROBLEMS IN PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
FOR A CHANGING PROFESSION 428-36 (4th ed. 2002) (examining the ethical considerations
of traditional representation through correspondence between Davis Dudley, attorney for
Erie Railroad, and Samuel Bowles, of Springfield Republican).
2 See Bryant C. Danner, The Growth of Large Law Firms and Its ETect on the Legal

248

ST JOHN'SJOURNAL OFLEGAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 17:247

and business expansion have altered the formally simple relationship between the business clients and their legal representatives, leaving archaic the protection that the ethics code afforded
these relationships.
Today it is not uncommon for a large individual business entity
to be represented by a variety of law firms while a single individual law firm may represent a variety of businesses. 3 As a result,
law firms have grown and expanded dramatically, but the increase in the complexity of relationships with clients has not yet
been considered or reflected in the ethical guidelines. 4 As a consequence, the client's protection has eroded, and with it, the corporate client's choice of legal representation.5
All law firms, and all lawyers, must follow state rules of professional responsibility when dealing with conflict issues. 6 In order to address the issues arising out of the need to protect the
client, in 1970 the American Bar Association created the ABA
Model Code of Professional Responsibility, and in 1983 was suProfession and Legal Education:Looking atLarge Law Firms- Any Role Left for the Law
Schools, 64 IND. L. J. 447, 447 (1989) (explaining how Chief Justice William Rehnquist
felt institutional loyalty was declining due to the increasing growth of firms); KAUFMAN &
WILKINS, supra note 1, at 16-18 (outlining the changes in rules of professional responsibility to keep pace with profession); Joan Travistino, RegulatingMulti-State Law Firms, 32
STAN. L. REV. 1211, 1211-14 (1980) (noting that "prior to the adoption in 1969 of the ABA
Model Code of Professional Responsibility, few firms maintained offices in other states").
3 See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-388 (1994) (stating "growth, development, and diversity of the legal profession" have moved lawyers away
from traditional practice models and toward large networks spreading over numerous cities); Lehman, supra note 1, at § 3 at 3 (outlining how specialization changed the legal profession); Stuart Taylor Jr., Law Firms Becoming Nationalin Scope, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11,
1981, § 12 at 50 (describing the expansion of firms as designed "to provide a much wider
array of services" to clients).
4 See KAUFMAN & WILKINS, supra note 1, at 15 (describing the recent increases in
attention to legal ethics due to a greater complexity in the profession); Tamar Lewin,
What's New in the Legal Profession, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 1984, § 3 at 17 (noting the
massive numbers of clients represented by big firms). See generally Barbara A. Curran,
THE LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT, THE U.S. LEGAL PROFESSION IN 1995 (Am. Bar Found.
Jan. 1, 1999) (discussing the increase in size and scope of firms).
5 The increasingly complex relationships, especially impacting the New York City
business arena, is not considered or acknowledged in the Disciplinary Recommendations
made by the New York State Code of Professional Responsibility.
6 See James Podgers, Ethics Code Rework: New ABA Model Rules May Be Under
Construction in the Next Few Months, 87 A.B.A.J. 58, 58 (2001) (explaining "the model
rules serve as the basis for binding rules of professional conduct for lawyers in 42 states
and the District of Columbia"); Stuart Taylor Jr., Ethics Code Isn't Open and Shu N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 7, 1983, § 4 at 7 (explaining how applying the Model Rules could result in
disciplinary action for attorneys if adopted by the state). See generally Beth Nolan, Removing Conflicts From the Administration of Justice: Conflicts of Interest and Independent Counsels Under the Ethics in Government Act, 79 GEO. L.J. 1, 1-2 (1990) (discussing
historical situations in which independent counsel has faced conflicts).
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perceded by the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct.7
While not binding, each state has adopted at least the framework
of the Rules; some have adopted the Rules in toto, while others
have chosen to incorporate their own ideas, and federal courts
generally take on the rules of the state in which they sit.8
Difficulties arise when issues are resolved according to the
Model Rules but results are contrary to the purpose of the Rules
or conflict with the way the courts are interpreting how a situation should be resolved. 9 This has occurred more recently with
the expansion of law firms and their attempts to match a wide
variety of corporate needs.10 Likewise, growth within multinational companies, expansions both within the corporation and
geographically, causes the creations of non-traditional attorneyclient relationship.II Conflicts of interest arise much more frequently in these non-traditional relationships, often leading to
disqualification.12 The traditional conflict of interest occurs
7 See A New Ethucs Code: ABA Adopts Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 70
A.B.A.J. 79, 79 (1984) (announcing the adoption of the Model Rules and explaining the
history of preceding ethical codes); Stuart Taylor Jr., U.S. Criticizes ABA's Lawyer Code,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1984, at D17 (noting that the ABA adopted rules after years of debate). See generallyMODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (1983).
8 See KAUFMAN & WlLKINS, supra note 1, at 16-17 (stating that by 1983 every state
had adopted a model code of professional responsibility in some form and the trend in federal courts is to adopt rules adhered to by local courts although there is no standard practice); see also I.B.M. v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271, 279 n.2 (3d Cir. 1978) (illustrating how federal courts use ethical rules as adopted by state courts); Ethical Standards for Attorneys
for the Government 28 U.S.C. § 530 (B) (2002) (making state ethics rules binding on U.S.
attorneys in federal courts).
9 See generallyMary C. Daly, Resolving Ethical Conficts in MultiurisdictionalPractice-Is Rule 8.5 the Answer, an Answer or No Answer atAll, 36 S. TEX. L. REV. 715, 74748 (1995) (addressing multijurisdictional conflicts); Lawrence K. Hellman, When "Ethics
Rules"Don't Mean What They Say: The Implicationsof StrainedABA Ethics Opinions, 10
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 317, 323 (indicating the Model Rules often suffer from varying interpretations); Cristy Ray, Recent OpinionsFrom the ABA StandingCommittee on Ethics
and ProfessionalResponsibility, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1099, 1115 (pointing out that a
court may override the duty of confidentiality).
10 See Taylor, supra note 3, §12 at 50 (outlining the expansion of law firms). See generally A New Ethics Code: ABA Adopts Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 70 A.B.A.J.
79, 79 (1984) (explaining how changes in the legal profession increased court challenges of
rules and spurred modification of the Code); Danner, supra note 2, at 447 (discussing
Chief Justice Rehnquist's belief that large firms present major ethical issues).
11 See Analytica, Inc. v. NPD Research, 708 F.2d 1263, 1274 (7th Cir. 1983) (Coffey,
dissenting) (explaining how changes in firm size and legal practice complicate a conflict of
interest analysis); see also Steel v. General Motors Corp., 912 F. Supp. 724, 746 (D. N.J.
1995) (disqualifying a firm because of its failure to screen new associates). See generally
Brennan's Inc. v. Brennan's Rests. Inc., 590 F.2d 168, 174 (5th Cir. 1979) (disqualifying
an attorney for representing a client in a patent dispute against a split off company which
the attorney had previously represented).
12 See KAUFMAN & WILKINS, supra note 1, at 35 (commenting on how conflicts of interest have always been among the most serious problems in the legal profession). See
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where representation of one client conflicts with the representation of another client.13 To resolve these issues business and law
firms should turn to the Model Rules for guidance on how to
handle such situations. Unfortunately, in the area of corporate
conflict of interest the Rules are often unhelpful. The Rules can
create confusion and in some cases, recommend a result that
counters the overall purpose of the Rules.14
This article will examine some of the difficult situations that
have arisen out of the growing corporate and legal structures and
their possible resolutions according to the Code. Part I sets out
hypothetical situations which are referred to in the subsequent
sections. Part II describes the problems that exist in these hypothetical situations according to the rules as they stand. Part III
addresses the resolutions suggested by the Code. Part IV suggests possible alternatives to the existing Code.
PART I-HYPOTHETICAL SITUATIONS
HypotheticalI - ConcurrentConflict.: Current Client conflicts
Consider the situation in which party X contracts with A who
later goes into business with B. B's long-standing counsel, law
firm C, represents B. X later begins litigation to recoup compensation for a liability stemming from the original transaction for
generally MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2002) (stating the general rules for
conflicts of interest); Arthur D. Burger Tiptoeing Between New Conflicts, LEGAL TIMES,
Aug. 10, 1998, at 23 (discussing the increased pressure to address potential conflicts of
interest and inherent difficulties).
13 See Stratagem Dev. Corp. v. Heron Int'l N.V., 756 F. Supp. 789, 792 (S.D.N.Y.
1991) (explaining that courts are to apply a per se rule of disqualification for conflicts of
interest concerning concurrent representation); see also I.B.M, 579 F.2d at 283 (holding
disqualification appropriate for conflicts of interest even absent any specific injury). See
generally MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (a)(1) (2002) (describing representation of clients with adverse interests as conflicted).
14 Compare Lara E. Romansic, Conflict of Interest: Stand by Your Client?" Opinion
95-390 and Conflicts ofInterest in CorporateFamilies, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 307, 308
(1998) (noting "Model Rule 1.7, the basis for Opinion 95-390, seems to allow for representation of a party with interests adverse to the existing client's corporate affiliate"), with
Edward S. Adams & John H. Matheson, Law Firms on the Big Board?"A Proposalfor
Nonlawyer Investment in Law Firms, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 14 (1998) (stating "Rule 1.7
prohibits representing directly adverse clients or clients whose representation may be materially limited by responsibilities to other clients"). See generallyMiriam P. Hechler, The
Role of the CorporateAttorney Within the Takeover Context: Loyalties to Whom , 21 DEL
J. CORP. L. 943, 944-45 (1996) (discussing the functions and problems involved with attorneys' roles in corporate takeovers, and the lack of guidance offered by the Model
Rules).
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which he alleges A and B owe him. The Rules stipulate C cannot
represent B unless both X and A sign a waiver. If X refuses, B
will be forced to spend time and money finding, hiring and informing a new attorney from a new firm about this litigation. By
doing so X is supplied with a strategic opportunity in which X
may use the Code of Ethics Rules that exist for B's protection to
X's own benefit. In effect, X appears to have the opportunity to
use the protection meant for B to his advantage. X gains more
leverage by potentially delaying the litigation, and causing
greater expense to A and B-factors which may increase A and
B's willingness to settle.
HypotheticalII - ConcurrentConflict: Affiliated Corporations
Attorney C represents company A on a transactional basis. A is
a subsidiary of company Z. C also represents Y in litigation
against Z. According to the Ethical Considerations, it is understood from the Model Code15 that representation of a company
does not by itself bind a lawyer to its client's parent/subsidiaries,
which would allow C the freedom to represent Y in a suit against
Z.16

HypotheticalIII- Successive Conflict: The SubstantialRelation
Test
Attorney C has represented client corporation A in the past either on a transactional basis or in litigation. Y seeks to hire C in
litigation against A. Under the Model Rules, subsequent representation of a client adverse to a former client poses a problem
where the matter of the representation is 'substantially simi15 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (a)(2) (2002) (stating a concurrent
conflict of interest exists where there is a significant risk that the representation will be
materially limited by the attorney's responsibilities to another client, former client, third
party, or lawyer's personal interest); id. at R. 1.7 cmt. 1 (asserting "[L]oyalty and independent judgment are essential elements in the lawyer's relationship to a client."); Douglas R. Richmond, Accommodation Clients, 35 AKRON L. REV. 59, 62 (2001) (noting "Rule
1.7 (a) forbids concurrent adverse representations even where the opposing clients' matters are wholly unrelated").
16 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (a) (2002) (stating lawyers employed
or retained by an organization represent the organization through its duly authorized
constituents); GEN-COR, LLC v. Buckeye Corrugated, Inc., 111 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1057
(2000) (denying a motion to disqualify counsel in a suit between a parent company and its
subsidiary). But see Musheno v. Gensemer, 897 F. Supp. 833, 836-37 (1995) (noting an
attorney's ability to represent both an organization and its constituents under Rule 1.13 is
subject to Rule 1.7).
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lar." 7 With some exceptions, attorney C will be required to reject
Y as a client. 1s
HypotheticalIV- Successive Conflict. Affiliated Corporations
and the SubstantialRelation Test
An added twist combines Hypothetical II and III. This occurs
where Attorney C has formerly represented Company A, a subsidiary of Z. Y, a subsidiary of X, seeks representation by C in
litigation against Z. If the former representation of A contained
matter substantially similar to the representation Y seeks, C will
be unable to accept Y as a client, despite never having represented Z, the adverse party.
PART II-EXISTING PROBLEMS WITH THE APPLYING THE
RULES
Focusing on Hypothetical example I, current client conflicts,
which may occur when a law firm, with a long-standing relationship representing its client in transactional interactions, may be
barred from representing the same client in litigation stemming
from one of those transactions because the Model Rules do not allow any adverse representation that may be a basis for a clientclient conflict of interest.19 The underlying purpose of Model
Rule 1.7 is to protect the element of loyalty 20 in the attorney17 See Lazy Oil Co. v. Witco Corp., 166 F.3d 581, 589 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting the policies underlying Rule 1.9 include preventing confidences from being used against former
clients); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.9 (a) (2002) (stating, after formerly representing a client, an attorney cannot represent another person in same or substantially related matters in which the second client's interests are materially adverse to
the interests of the first client); id. at R. 1.9 cmt. 3 (defining 'substantially related' as involving the same transaction, or a substantial risk that confidential information obtained
in prior representation would materially advance the client's position in a subsequent
matter).
18 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.9 (a) (2002) (allowing representation
where a former client has given written consent after consultation); id. at R. 1.9 (c)(2)
(recognizing that other rules may require or permit revealing information protected under
Rule 1.9); id. at R. 1.9 cmt. 1 (discussing the general rule that lawyers have certain
continuing duties regarding confidentiality and conflicts of interest even after the clientlawyer relationship ends).
19 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 6 (2002) (prohibiting representation of any litigation against a current client (absent consent), even if the matters are
completely unrelated); id. at R. 1.7 cmt. 3 (stating reasonable preventive procedures must
be adopted to protect a firm from creating conflict); id. at R. cmt. 7 (noting that directly
adverse conflicts may arise in transactional matters).
20 See I.B.M. v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271, 283 (3d Cir. 1978) (noting an attorney's failure to
provide undivided loyalty produces a decrease in public confidence and creates an appear-
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client relationship, the client confidences, an appearance of
proper form 2' and the rule governing lawyer independence.22 The
standard adopted by the Code to determine whether a clientclient conflict exists is whether a disinterested attorney would
advise either client against this representation. 23 While this
seems straightforward, practical situations arise that push the
definitions of the provision's wording to the point of, in some instances, contorting the actual purpose of the Code itself.
Hypothetical II, affiliated corporations, can take the various
forms. One example is where a lawyer represents a syndicate on
a transactional basis. 24 If one member decides to sue another
member on a wholly unrelated matter the transactional lawyer
ance of impropriety which may lead to disqualification); Lazy Oil, 166 F.3d at 589 (upholding a duty of loyalty to any client that has a right to expect such loyalty); Prisco v.
Westgate Entm't, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 266, 271 (D.Conn. 1992) (noting "Rule 1.9 is designed
to address not only the narrow need to protect client's confidences, but also to establish
broader standards of attorney loyalty.").
21 See IB.M, 579 F.2d at 283; Analytica, Inc. v. NPD Research, 708 F.2d 1263, 127778 (7th Cir. 1983) (Coffey, J., dissenting) (suggesting that a law firm that switched sides
created an appearance of impropriety which could be cured through means other than
disqualification); Prisco, 799 F. Supp. at 271 (noting one goal of Rule 1.9 is to maintain
the public's trust in the legal system); see also Gregory Zimmer, Conflict of Interest: Sumg a Current Client Responsibility and Respectability in the Conduct of the Legal Profession, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 371, 391 (1998) (noting "in many court decisions rejecting concurrent representation, the act of suing a current client can harm ... the
maintenance of public confidence in the legal profession.").
22 See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105 (C) (stipulating "a lawyer
may represent multiple clients if it is obvious that he can adequately represent the interests of each and if each consents to the representation after full disclosure of the possible
effect of such a representation on the exercise of his independent professional judgment
on behalf of each"); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (1995) (suggesting the intended meaning of 'obvious that he can adequately represent' in DR 5-105 (c) means if
there is a reasonable belief that personal interests or desires will adversely affect services
rendered or advice given, representation should be declined); id. at R. 1.7 cmt. 14 (noting
if a lawyer's dual role as director and corporate attorney compromises the lawyer's independence, she should not serve as director).
23 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 5 (1995) (noting "when a
disinterested lawyer would conclude that the client should not agree to the representation
under the circumstances, the lawyer involved cannot properly ask for such agreement or
provide representation on the basis of the client's consent"). See generally 22 NYCRR §
1200.20 (2002) (noting the standard applies to an attorney whose business, personal property, or financial interests may be reasonably believed to affect the exercise of her professional judgment on behalf of client); Douglas R. Richmond, ChoosingSides: Issue or Positional Conflicts, 51 FLA. L. REV. 383, 389 (1999) (noting the standard of a lawyer's belief
of reasonableness of representation under Rule 1.7 is objective).
24 See BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 1463 (7th ed. 1999) (defining a syndicate as "a group
organized for a common purpose; an association formed to promote a common interest,
carry out a particular business transaction"). See generallyCharles Robert Davidson, Reform and Repression in Mubarak's Egypt, 24 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 75, 84 (2000)
(stating professional syndicates include groups of lawyers, doctors, and journalists); Honorable Vaughn R. Walker, Response: The Task Force Got it Wrong, 74 TEMPLE L. REV.
783, 794 (2001) (noting a group of lawyers may constitute a syndicate).
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may be barred from representing either side of the litigation. 25
Some states have found this to be a per se conflict, while other
states have been less harsh, but still found the same result.26
Critics of both believe no rule should apply in the analysis unless
there is some connection between the matter being litigated and
the transaction of the syndicate. 27 Comment 3 assists in giving
guidance by stating the rationale for the Rule. In effect it states
a lawyer retained by an organization represents that organization through its constituents. 28 This guideline is clear enough by
itself; however, applying the guidelines found in Comment 2 confuses the matter. It states: "officers, directors, employees and
shareholders are the constituents of the corporate organizational
client."29
In the practical business world, the definition of a subsidiary is
nothing more than a corporate form of a shareholder.30 Comment
25 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 29 (2002) (stating "[O]rdinarily,
the lawyer will be forced to withdraw from representing both clients if the common representation fails"); id. at R. 1.7 cmt. 4 (recognizing where any conflict regarding multiple
clients emerges after representation has been undertaken, whether representation may
continue with either party is dependent upon the lawyer's ability to comply with duties to
each client (current or prior), and her ability to effectively represent the remaining client,
given the duties to her other client); id. at R. 1.7 cmt. 7 (noting "if a lawyer is asked to
represent the seller of a business in negotiations with a buyer represented by the lawyer,
not in the same transaction but in another, unrelated matter, the lawyer could not undertake the representation without the informed consent of each client").
26 See 22 NYCRR § 1200.28 (stating a lawyer represents the organization and not any
of its constituents. According to the comment this means representation does not extend
to the organization's directors, employees, shareholders, or other constituents); F.T.C. v.
Exxon Corp., 636 F.2d 1336, 1345 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (requiring lawyers to treat a wholly
owned subsidiary as a separate and distinct client from its parent corporation); Stratagem
Dev. Corp. v. Heron Int'l N.V., 756 F. Supp. 789, 793 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (noting similar rulings).
27 See Ronald D. Rotunda, Sister Act: Conflicts of Interest with Sister Corporations,1
J. INST. STUD. LEG. ETH. 215, 217-18 (2000) (arguing against per se rules of conflicting
interests where there is no substantial relationship between two issues). See generally
Lawrence E. Mitchell, ProfessionalResponsibility and the Close Corporations: Toward a
Realistic Ethics, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 466, 484-85 (1989) (elucidating the practical consequences and their effect on lawyers' actions); Charles W. Wolfram, Legal Ethics: Corporate-Family Conflict, 2 J. INST. STUD. LEG. ETH. 295, 316-18 (2001) (proposing a more fact
sensitive analysis based on close corporation theory and attorney intent).
28 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7, cmt. 3. See generally Ellen A.
Pansky, Between an Ethical Rock and a HardPlace: BalancingDuties to the Organizational Client and Its Constituent, 37 S. TEX. L. REV. 1167, 1170 (1996) (articulating this
as a well-established interpretation adopted by the ABA); Rotunda, supra note 27, at 242
(utilizing a hypothetical suit between KFC and Taco Bell to illustrate intent).
29 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7, cmt. 2. See Pansky, supra note 28, at
1170 (providing that under Model Rule 1.13 constituents are officers, directors, employees
and shareholders); Rotunda, supra note 27, at 236 (indicating the importance of language
in Comment 2).
30 See generallyJohn M. Brown, ParentCorporation'sLiability Under CERCLA Section 107 for the Environmental Violations of Their Subsidiaries,31 TULSA L.J. 819, 838-
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3 further warns the relationship between the attorney and the
corporate client, "does not mean, however, that constituents of an
organizational client are the clients of the lawyer."3 1 Therefore,
by default, according to the Code, the lawyer does not represent
the organizations subsidiaries.32 Courts have ruled otherwise
and based on such court rulings companies have recently begun
the practice of requiring attorneys to sign contracts stating, in effect, that representation of one of the corporation's affiliates transcends to representation of all its subsidiaries and parent corporations. 33
This would have a dramatic affect in the case of multinational
corporations that deal with hundreds of other corporations annually. Florida was the first state to address the issue in a Comment to its State Disciplinary Rules by including the guideline,
"an attorney or law firm who represents or has represented a
corporation ordinarily is not presumed to also represent, solely
by virtue of representing or having represented the client, or organization (such as a corporate parent or subsidiary) that is affiliated with the client." 34
39 (1996) (discussing parent liability for environmental violations); Deborah DeMott, The
Mechanisms of Control,13 CONN. J. INT'L. L. 233, 237 (1999) (discussing the control corporations exercise over their subsidiaries); Simon R. Malko, Determining ParentCorp.'s
Liability Against SubsidiaryEmployee, EMP. L. STRATEGIST, July 1998, at 1 (discussing
parent liability to subsidiary employees).
31 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7, cmt. 3. See generallyH. Lowell Brown,
The Dilemma of Corporate Counsel Faced with Client Misconduct. Disclosure of Client
Confidences or Constructive Discharge,44 BUFFALO L. REV. 777, 780 (1996) (indicating
the importance of this comment for understanding the attorney-client relationship in corporate representation); Wolfram, supra note 27, at 319 n.81 (suggesting that the comment
extends beyond corporate form).
32 See generallyDan S. Boyd, Current Trends in Conflict of Interest Law, 53 BAYLOR
L. REV. 1, 27-28 (2001) (indicating that initial court interpretation was an "all affiliates"
doctrine that treated all related corporate entities as single entity for conflict analysis);
William J. Rands, Domination of a Subsidiary by a Parent,32 IND. L. REV. 421, 447
(1999) (discussing the liability of parent corporations); Romansic, supra note 14, at 307-08
(stating the increasing complexity of attorney-client relations has led to difficult questions).
33 See Rotunda, supra note 27, at 232 (suggesting that even silence in an engagement
letter can be interpreted to constitute a waiver); Maureen Castellano, ABA Goes Easy on
CorporateFamily Conflicts, N.J.L.J., Mar. 13, 1995, at 3 (citing one of the three dissenting opinions "in all but the rarefied Fortune 500 world, taking on such adverse representation would be outrageous and a clear conflict of interest"); Pansky, supra note 28, at
1178-79 (indicating that some jurisdictions require privity of contract to extend the
relationship to the constituents).
34 Comment to Fla. Rule 4-1.13, effective Jan. 1, 1992. See Ronald D. Rotunda, Conflicts Problems when Representing Members of CorporateFamilies, 72 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 655, 687 n.104 (1997) (noting the comment's importance in overturning the per se
rule of disqualification); Rotunda, supra note 27, at 245 n.87 (indicating the importance of
the comment regarding per se disqualification).
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According to a Formal Opinion issued by the American Bar Association:
a lawyer may not accept such a representation without consent of the corporate client if the circumstances are such that
the affiliate should also be considered a client of the lawyer;
or if there is an understanding between the lawyer and the
corporate client that the lawyer will avoid representations
adverse to the client's corporate affiliates; or if the lawyer's
obligations to either the corporate client or the new, adverse
client, will materially limit the lawyer's representation of the
5
other client. 3
A contract between the attorney and the company's affiliates
could effectively negate the loophole created by the application of
the Model Code and bar the attorney from representing an adverse party against all of the client corporation's subsidiaries. 36
So far the focus has been on situations without similar subject
matter, but critics point out there is also confusion whether the
matters overlap. 37 For example, if the subject matter of one of
the representations is litigation it is considered a conflict, how35 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Formal Opinion 95-390 (1995),
Conflicts of Interest in the Corporate Family Context states in full:
a lawyer who represents a corporate client is not by that fact alone necessarily
barred from a representation that is adverse to a corporate affiliate of that client in
an unrelated matter. However, a lawyer may not accept such a representation
without consent of the corporate client if the circumstances are such that the affiliate should also be considered a client of the lawyer; or if there is an understanding
between the lawyer and the corporate client that the lawyer will avoid representations adverse to the client's corporate affiliates; or if the lawyer's obligations to either the corporate client or the new, adverse client, will materially limit the lawyer's representation of the other client. Even if the circumstances are such that
client consent is not ethically required, as a matter of prudence and good practice a
lawyer who contemplates undertaking a representation adverse to a corporate affiliate of a client will be well advised to discuss the matter with the client before
undertaking the representation.
See generallyBoyd, supra note 32, at 27-28 (reviewing emerging trends in conflicts of interest); Romansic, supra note 14, at 307-08 (discussing the increasing complexity of corporate families).
36 See Unified Sewage Agency v. Jelco, Inc., 646 F.2d 1339, 1346 n.6 (9th Cir. 1981)
(ruling advance waivers are legitimate and noting a party can be estopped from revoking
consent where there is reliance). See generally Romansic, supra note 14, at 311 (indicating the trend among law firms to declare that they represent the corporation alone and
not its affiliates or subsidiaries); Rotunda, supra note 34, at 673-74 (elucidating closure of
the loophole that may be embodied in engagement letters).
37 See Boyd, supranote 32, at 11 (distinguishing between related and unrelated matters); see also Stephen E. Kalish, An InstrumentalInterpretationof Model Rule 1.7(a) in
the Corporate Family Situation: Unintended Consequences in Pandora's Box, 30
MCGEORGE L. REV. 37, 43 (1998) (relying on a similar case to distinguish unrelated and
related matters); Rotunda, supra note 34, at 686 (indicating that courts, in at least one
instance, have not found a conflict when dealing with unrelated matters).
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ever a court may still allow the representation. 3 8
The New York County Lawyers' Association Committee on Professional Ethics ruled that a law firm that represents a parent
corporation may also represent a party with interests adverse to
a subsidiary of the parent corporation in a matter unrelated if:
(1) the law firm does not have access to relevant information adverse to the subsidiary; (2) if there is no attorney-client relationship between the law firm and the subsidiary; and (3) if the parent-corporation's interests are not materially affected by actions

against its subsidiary. 39 Also, where both representations are
transactional, courts are apt to allow the representations, as they
are not "'adverse" to one of the parties. 40
Courts interpret "'adverse' to mean "adverse" in the context of
litigation, despite a possible contrary definition in the Code. 4 1
However, Comment 3 gives some guidance, by stating, "a lawyer
may not act as advocate against a person the lawyer represents
in some other matter."42 Bankruptcy courts, likewise unable to
rely on a definition from the Bankruptcy Code, have defined 'adverse interest' as any "economic interest that negatively affects
the estate or related parties" that could create a potential or ac-

38 See Commonwealth Ins. Co. v. Stone Container Corp., 178 F. Supp. 2d 938, 943
(N.D. Ill. 2001) (holding Rule 1.7 (b) does not bar law firm X during the course of representing client Y against Z, from agreeing to act as expert witness for Z in an unrelated
litigation); see also Gould, Inc. v. Mitsui Mining & Smelting Co., 738 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D.
Ohio 1990) (holding Rule 1.7 does not bar a firm from representing a plaintiff because of
an unrelated patent representation of defendant); Picker Int'l, Inc. v. Varian Assocs., 670
F. Supp. 1363 (N.D. Ohio 1987) (holding Rule 1.7 does not bar a firm from representation
based on unrelated representation in matters unrelated to the patent suit).
39 Comm. on Professional Ethics, New York County Lawyers' Ass'n, Op. 684 (1991).
See generally Patrick M. Connors, Survey: Professional Responsibility, 50 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 827, 832 (2000) (indicating important restraints on the ABA bright line rule); Kalish,
supranote 37, at 40 (elucidating the New York opinion).
40 I.B.M. v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271, 280 (3d Cir. 1978) (holding some "adverse effect may
result from the attorney's adversary posture toward that client in another legal matter"
and noting one element that may be affected is the attorney's "vigor" in representing his
client). See Kalish, supra note 37, at 40 (indicating a low likelihood of success even given
an "appearance of impropriety" rubric); Maria B. Rubin, Conflicts and the Corporate Clent: Fact or Fiction? N.Y.L.J., July 20, 1995, at 1 (disagreeing with the decision by the
ABA Committee on Ethics to allow multiple representation in some cases without the
consent of both parties).
41 See Worldspan, L.P. v. Sabre Group Holdings, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 1356, 1362 (N.D.
Ga. 1998) (reviewing the adverse standard in a litigation context); Griva v. Davison, 637
A.2d 830, 843 (D.C. 1994) (discussing adversity under the ABA Model Rules from a litigation perspective); Fisons Corp. v. Atochem N. Am., Inc., No. 90 Civ. 1080, 1990 U.S. Dist.
Lexis 15284, *7 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 1990) (stating the adverse standard in a litigation context).
42 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7, cmt. 3.
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tual dispute. 4 3 Illinois has adopted the adverse standard to apply
to general attorney conflicts, and the courts in that state have determined both a loan transaction and partnership agreement
qualify as adverse interests. 44
Hypothetical situation III, substantial relation test, is addressed simply in the Successive Conflicts of Interest portion of
the Model Rules which stipulates the standard for determining
when a lawyer shall not ethically be allowed to represent a client
unless the former client consents after consultation.45 The test is
whether the matter to be represented is "'substantially related"
to a matter involved in a former representation, and unlike concurrent representations, is generally not considered prima facie
improper. 4 6 While more lenient, the subsequent representation
43 See Alexander G. Benisatto & Alison M. Fiedler, The DisinterestedStandard of
Section 327(a): Applying an Equitable Solution for PotentialConflicts in Small Bankruptcies, 7 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 363, 369 (1999) (describing section 327 (a) as ensuring
undivided loyalty from representing attorneys and requiring termination of counsel to
remedy improper administration of estates); see also Joseph D. Vaccaro & Marc R. Milano, Section 327(a): A Statute in Conflict: A Proposed Solution to Conflicts of Interest in
Bankruptcy, 5 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 237, 241 (1997) (indicting bankruptcy courts' inability to uniformly define conflicts of interest as stated in Section 327 (a) of Bankruptcy
Code); Gerald K. Smith, Standards for the Employment of Professionalsin Bankruptcy
Cases: A Response to ProfessorZywicki's "Casefor Retaining the DisinterestednessRequirement for Debtorin Possession'sProfessionals",18 MISS. C. L. REV. 327, 348 (1998)
(stating bankruptcy courts have difficulty applying the Code's conflict of interest language
which has resulted in a lack of uniformity and certainty).
44 See Ze'-ev Eiger & Brandy Rutan, Conflicts of Interest: Attorneys Representing
Parties With Adverse Interests in the Same Commercial Transaction, 14 GEo. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 945, 947 (2001) (comparing the penalties invoked for failure to advise clients
where adverse conflicts exist); David J. Fish, The Use of the Illinois Rules of Professional
Conduct to Establish the Standardof Care in Attorney Malpractice Litigation:An Illogical Practice, 23 S. ILL. U. L.J. 65, 66-70 (1998) (discussing how Illinois has applied the
Model Code's adverse interest standard). See generally SWS Fin. Fund A v. Salomon
Bros., 790 F. Supp. 1392, 1394 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (holding attorneys liable for undertaking
adverse representation for their partnership client).
45 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.9 (stating, "a lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent another person in the same or
a substantially related matter in which that person's interests are materially adverse to
the interests of the former client unless the former client consents after consultation.").
See generally Andrew J. Drucker, Explanations, Suggestions, and Solutions to Conflict
Tracking and Prevention in Response to the Growth and Expansion of the LargerLaw
Firm, 24 DEL. J. CORP.L. 529, 542 (1999) (discussing Model Rule 1.9's guiding role when
there are possible conflicts with former clients); Richard W. Painter, Advance Waiver of
Conflicts, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 289, 315 (2000) (discussing when Rule 1.9 requires an
attorney to obtain her client's consent).
46 See Marc I. Steinberg & Timothy U. Sharpe, Attorney Conflicts of Interest: The
Need for a Coherent Framework,66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 6 (1990) (discussing the implications of the doctrines, such as the duty of loyalty and intent to preserve attorneyclient relationship, in the standard); see also Drucker, supra note 45, at 542 (discussing
three approaches in defining "substantially related" under Rule 1.9); Neil W. Hamilton &
Kevin R. Coan, Are We a Profession or Merely a Business? The Erosion of the Conflicts
Rules Through the Increased Use of Ethical Walls, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 57, 66 (1998) (dis-
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47
standard seems to affect a wider variety of situations.
Different states have interpreted the guideline to refer to the
timing of when the test should be applied. 4 8 For example, California courts presume this phrase applies after client confidentiality has been abused;49 New York courts use the standard as a
method for attorneys to measure whether similarities in litigation exist before they have accepted a client. 50 This difference in
timing depending on the state court's interpretation could cause
problems in future litigation should a conflicts of laws issue
arise.5 1 The differences are further compounded when assessing
what matters are 'substantially related."' 52 Two tests are genercussing Model Rule 1.9 and the "substantially related" standard).
47 See Steinberg & Sharpe, supranote 46, at 9 (describing the standard for successive
conflicts of interest as more 'farther-reaching' than the test for concurrent conflicts). See
generallyJonathan J. Lerner, Honoring Choice by ConsentingAdults: Prospective Conflict Waivers as a Mature Solution to Ethical Gamesmanship - A Response to Mr. Fox, 29
HOFSTRA L. REV. 971, 978 (2001) (discussing the subsequent representation standard);
Zachary Tobin, Towards a More BalancedBalancing-A ChronologicalApproach to Attorney Disqualificationfor PriorRepresentation, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 219 (1985) (discussing
the loosening of courts' interpretations of subsequent representation and substantial relationship standards).
48 See Exterior Sys. v. Noble Composites, Inc., 210 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1065 (N.D. Ind.
2001) (analyzing facts that existed when an attorney accepted the client); State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Federal Ins. Co., 72 Cal. App. 4th 1422, 1430 (App. Dist. 1999)
(Dibiaso J., concurring) (suggesting the assumption that confidences were disclosed in a
former relationship that may be important in subsequent representation); Cinema 5, Ltd.
v. Cinemera, Inc., 528 F.2d 1384, 1386 (2d Cir. 1976) (focusing on the time before the attorney accepted the client).
49 See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 72 Cal. App. 4th at 1430 (applying the test after the client's confidentiality had been abused); Forrest v. Baeza, 58 Cal. App. 4th 65, 73
(App. Dist. 1997) (stating the initial focus should be on the subjects of former and current
representation); Flatt v. Superior Court, 885 P.2d 950, 954 (Cal. 1994) (stating that the
governing test requires the client demonstrate a "substantial relationship" between the
subjects of the antecedent and current representations).
50 See Cinema, 528 F.2d at 1386 (focusing on whether similarities in litigation existed
before the attorney accepted the client). See generally Aerojet Props., Inc. v. State, 530
N.Y.S.2d 624, 625 (App. Div. 1988) (stating the focus should be on the issues in litigation
and the subject matter of prior representation); Leber Assocs. v. Entm't Group Fund, Inc.,
00 Civ. 3759, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20352, *14 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2001) (assessing facts
that existed prior to litigation).
51 See Philip K. Lyon & Bruce H. Philips, ProfessionalResponsibilityin the Federal
Courts: ConsistencyIs Cloakedin Confusion, 50 ARK. L. REV. 59, 73-74 (1997) (suggesting
a push to settle reaches the client's substantive rights and therefore the rules of ethics
may be subject to the Erie doctrine). See generally David Hricik & Jae Ellis, Disparities
in Legal Ethical StandardsBetween State and FederalJudicialSystems: An Analysis and
a Critique, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHiCS 577, 578-79 (2000) (discussing disparities between
the state and federal judiciaries' approach to ethics); Bruce A. Green, Whose Rules Should
Govern Lawyers in FederalCourt and How Should the Rules Be Created, 64 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 460, 460 (1996) (stating that rules of ethics vary from district to district).
52 See Painter, supra note 45, at 13. Painter advocates a narrower interpretation of
the Jelco holding and cites the premise that was suggested in Cinema 5, Ltd. v. Cinemera,
Inc., 528 F.2d 1384 (2d Cir. 1976), for measuring conflicts. A subsequent conflict standard
requires measuring representation against similarities in litigation whereas the stricter
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ally accepted. The first, recognized by New York courts, focuses
on the confidentiality between the former client and the attorney
and asks whether the matter of the previous representation is
within the attorney's knowledge and could be used in a manner
detrimental to the former client. 53 The second, less subjective
test, looks to whether the former and present representations
have similar factual situations.54
Under the subjective test, there needs to be only "a reasonable
probability that confidential information... [had been acquired
to] warrant... disqualification of counsel" due to a conflict of interest. 55 Courts for these states do not require a showing that the
confidences of the former client held by the representing attorney
were actually disclosed. 56 It is sufficient to show that the connection between the two matters was sufficiently similar that had
they been disclosed the former client would be disadvantaged. 57
standard for concurrent conflicts measures representation against the duty of undivided
loyalty to client. See generallyNora J. Pasman, The Conflict of "ConflictofInterest". The
Michigan Example, 1995 DET. C.L. REV. 133, 137 (1995) (discussing Michigan's approach
to the substantially related test); Jay J. Wang, Conflicts of Interest in Successive Representations: Protecting the Rights of Former Clients, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 275, 281
(1998) (discussing different states' approach to the substantially related test).
53 See Severino v. Dilorio, 587 N.Y.S. 2d 766, 768 (App. Div. 1992) (focusing on
whether matter of previous representation is within the attorney's knowledge and could
be used in a manner detrimental to a former client); Aeroje 530 N.Y.S.2d at 625 (focusing on whether the attorney's previous relationship can be used to harm the present client); LeberAssocs., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20352, at *14 (determining whether an attorney's prior knowledge can be detrimental to the client).
54 See Elan Transdermal Ltd. v. Cygnus Therapeutic Sys., 809 F. Supp. 1383, 1387-88
(N.D. Cal. 1992) (focusing on whether former and present representations have similar
factual situations). See generallyForrest,58 Cal. App. 4th at 73 (stating the focus should
be on the facts in the former and current representation); Flatt,885 P.2d at 954 (focusing
on the facts of the litigation).
55 Aerojet, 530 N.Y.S.2d at 625 (alteration in original) (noting the difference in the
application of "substantive test" depends on whether the case involves previous and subsequent clients, or simultaneous clients); see Greene v. Greene, 47 N.Y.2d 447, 453 (1979)
(holding a reasonable probability of disclosure will suffice to disqualify the attorney). Cf
Larson v. Rourick, No. C01-2073, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19041, at *8-9 (N.D. Iowa Sept.
27, 2002) (indicating a reasonable probability of receipt of confidences, even for expert
witnesses, was sufficient grounds for disqualification).
56 See Connors, supra note 39, at 834-35 (explaining at a minimum former clients
must prove reasonable probability); The Relationship Between the Texas Disciplinary
Rules of Professional Conduct and Legal Malpractice, 50 BAYLOR L. REV. 697, 725-26
(1995) (explaining that "reasonable probability" is a question of fact). See generally Alan
H. Casper & Paul R. Taskier, VicariousDisqualiicationof Co-CounselBecause of "Taint"
1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 155, 159-60 (1987) (noting it is often unclear when counsel should
be disqualified).
57 See GTE North, Inc. v. Apache Prods. Co., 914 F. Supp. 1575, 1579 (N.D. Ill. 1996)
(citing LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. County of Lake, 703 F.2d 252, 255-56 (7th Cir. 1983), setting
forth a three-part inquiry to disqualify an attorney for a conflict of interest); see also El
Paso v. Soule, 6 F. Supp. 2d 616, 621 (W.D. Tex. 1998) (setting forth a two-part test for
disqualifying an attorney); Hunkins v. Lake Placid Vacation Corp., 508 N.Y.S.2d 335, 337
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This is practically an irrebuttable presumption that may only be
countered by showing the attorney did not switch sides and that
the attorney did not share the former client's confidential information with attorneys for the adverse party. 5 8 Except for a few
exclusions to the rule, the test disregards the disadvantage to the
lawyer by focusing only on protecting the former client's confidences.59
The objective standard, referred to as the "Factual Reconstruction" test shifts the focus to the actual similarities present between the former representation and the subsequent representation. 60 As simple as this standard seems, different courts use
different methods to determine whether the situations are factually similar. 6 1
Some courts only require a showing of the similarity is necessary, and "actual possession of information is not required for an
order of disqualification," but other courts have implemented the
standard according to whether a reasonable person would deem
the issues involved important enough to be relevant in their similarity. 62 New York requires the similarity to be "patently clear",
(App. Div. 1988) (explaining that a plaintiff must at least show a substantial relationship
or specific confidential information that the attorney had already).
58 See United States v. Phillips, 952 F. Supp. 480, 483 (S.D. Tex. 1993) (quoting In re
American Airlines, Inc., 972 F.2d 605, 614 (5th Cir. 1992) and holding it may be reasonable for confidences to be breached); see also British Airways v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J.,
862 F. Supp. 889, 893 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (positing that upon a showing of reasonableness of
disclosure, the attorney must show there was no conflict in order to rebut the presumption); Aerojet, 530 N.Y.S.2d at 625 (mandating that the burden of proof be on the attorney
to prove no actual or apparent conflict of interest existed).
59 See Int'l Paper Co. v. Lloyd Mfg. Co., 555 F. Supp. 125, 133 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (holding
the presumption could be rebutted by showing the confidences were not shared with other
attorneys in law firm); GTE North, 914 F. Supp. at 1580 (quoting Westinghouse Elec.
Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311, 1319 (7th Cir. 1978), as stating a lawyer may
rebut by showing no express representation existed); Aerojet, 530 N.Y.S.2d at 625 (emphasizing the importance of requiring undivided loyalty to the client).
60 See Mitchell v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 01 Civ. 2112 (WHP), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
4675, at *22-23 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2002) (quoting Professor Wolfram on the "factualreconstruction test" concept). See generally Castillo v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,
938 F.2d 776, 781 (7th Cir. 1991) (Cudahy, J., concurring) (setting forth language for factual reconstruction); Novo Terapeutisk Laboratorium A/S v. Baxter Travenol Labs., 607
F.2d 186, 195-96 (7th Cir. 1979) (enumerating a three-part test, which includes the "factual reconstruction" test).
61 See Mitchell, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4675, at *22-23 (focusing "factual reconstruction" on prior representation); see also Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588
F.2d 221, (7th Cir. 1978) (applying the "factual reconstruction" test to the former representation); Exterior Sys. v. Noble Composites, Inc., 175 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1115-16 (N.D.
Ind. 2001) (clarifying the three parts of the substantial relation test are factual reconstruction, reasonableness of disclosure, and whether information is relevant to subsequent case).
62 Image Technical Servs. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 820 F. Supp. 1212, 1216-17 (N.D.
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meaning "identical" or "substantially the same."63 New York has
also implemented the 'peripheral similarity' exception, allowing
an attorney to remain in the representation if the prior involvement with the former client was limited to "brief, informal discussions on procedural matters or research on a specific point of
law." 64 Finally, some courts look for the similarities from the vantage of the subsequent litigation, as opposed to an overall com65
parison of the former and subsequent representations.
Imagine the problems involved with a conflict of law situation
where the outcome could turn on how the state interprets the
timing and the definition of "substantially related." For example
if a New York based law firm represents its California-based client on a transactional basis, confusion will arise as to what standard should be used; whether the standard should be employed
before or after the conflict arises. 66 While this rule originally did
not apply to all areas of legal practice, 67 case law has effectively
68
created the same standard for the private sector.
Cal. 1993) (explaining the informed consent exception to the basic rule of loyalty to clients); Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 70, 80 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)
(holding an attorney may neither injure nor use information obtained from or harmful to
a previous client). See generallyWang, supra,note 52, at 284 (comparing the two tests).
63 Mitchell, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4675, at '12. See LaSalle NatT Bank, 703 F.2d at
256 (concluding substantially identical agreements were sufficient as grounds for disqualification); United States Football League v. Nat'l Football League, 605 F. Supp. 1448,
1457 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (reiterating that substantially similar issues must rise to a patently
clear threshold in order for disqualification).
64 Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 756 (2d Cir.
1975). See Westinghouse, 588 F.2d at 225 (noting the exception of peripheral representation); Mitchell, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4675, at *25-26 (illustrating that mere prior peripheral representation may not be sufficient for disqualification).
65 Silver Chrysler, 518 F.2d at 756 (citing the Florida decision in McPartland v. ISI
Inv. Serv., 890 F. Supp. 1029, 1032 (M.D. Fla. 1995), which alters the viewpoint of the
comparison). See Castillo, 938 F.2d at 781 (Cudahy, J., concurring) (focusing on the current litigation). Cf LaSalle Nat7 Bank, 703 F.2d at 255 (comparing prior and subsequent
representation).
66 See generally Green, supra note 51, at 460 (arguing rules of ethics vary from district to district); Painter, supra note 45, at 290 (advocating a narrow interpretation);
Wang, supranote 52, at 284 (comparing the two tests).
67 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.11 (1998) (stating "a lawyer shall not
represent a private client in connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated
personally and substantially as a public officer or employee, unless the appropriate government agency consents after consultation"); see also Esther F. Lardent, PositionalConflicts in the Pro Bono Context: Ethical Considerationsand Market Forces,67 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2279, 2283-84 (1999) (describing why public interest and pro bono issues must remain exempt from the conflict rules). See generallyFirestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 371-72 (1981) (finding proof that an attorney notified the relevant parties sufficed to prevent disqualification).
68 See Analytica, Inc. v. NPD Research, 708 F.2d 1263, 1266-77 (7th Cir. 1983) (laying
out case law of the same effect as the Code for the substantially related test); see also
Teradyne, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., No. C-91-0344 MHP ENE, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
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Another example occurs in the scenario described in Hypothetical IV, affiliated corporations and the substantial relation
test. If a former client is a subsidiary of a company adverse to
the present representation, the former client may refuse to consent after consultation, not because it feels confidential information may be passed by the attorney, but simply as a method to
pressure the opponent to settle, or incur additional expense from
the time and energy spent looking for new counsel.69 This means
despite the attention given to the attorney's duty of confidentiality, the representation will cease where a company can use the
Rules to its advantage.70 This situation exemplifies how practical situations in the business world can use the Rules to create
results contrary to the purpose of the Rules.
There are two premises underlying the Rule: it is an attempt to
stem power or discretion vested in public authority that might be
used for the special benefit of a private client as well as considerations of the deeply-rooted duty of loyalty obligation the law
firm owes its client.7 1 What is surprising is one would assume
the rationale would turn solely on the issue of confidentiality, but
arguably, the duty of loyalty incorporates to protect the client's
8363, *6-7 (N.D. Cal. June 6, 1991) (referring to Formal Opinion No. 1989-113 of State
Bar of California's Standing Committee on Professional Responsibility and Conduct which
states, "determining counterpart to 1.7 (b) should be decided by the lawyer evaluating the
'separateness' of the entities, whether the corporation has distinct and independent management and board of directors"). See generallyUnified Sewage Agency v. Jelco, Inc., 646
F.2d 1339, 1345 (9th Cir. 1981) (inferring the standard must apply even without an existing conflict, even if motion was filed when conflict existed).
69 See Boyd, supranote 32, at 18 (noting that ethical rules should not be part of litigation strategies); Thomas D. Morgan, Suing a Current Client, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
1157, 1162 (1996) (hypothesizing that some clients may not grant consent "solely out of a
desire to make life difficult for the opponent"). See generally Stratagem Dev. Corp. v.
Heron Int'l N.V., 756 F. Supp. 789, 794 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (stating that lawyers can not simply choose between two clients based on which one will be more beneficial to lawyer's interests).
70 See Teradyne, Inc., 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *5 (allowing defendant company to
disqualify plaintiffs attorneys because of the attorney's prior representation of defendant's subsidiary); Barragree v. Tri-County Elec. Coop., 950 P.2d 1351, 1359 (Kan. 1997)
(noting the use of motions to disqualify can be used as litigation tactics); Douglas R. Richmond, The Rude Question of Standing in Attorney DisqualificationDisputes, 25 AM. J.
TRIAL ADVOC. 17, 19 (2001) (stating "disqualification motions have great potential for
abuse as a litigation tactic").
71 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.9 cmt. 3 (2002) (stating the lawyer owes
her client a duty of loyalty, even when the duty of confidentiality is not at issue). See generally Commonwealth Ins. Co. v. Stone Container Corp., 178 F. Supp. 2d 938, 947 (N.D.
Ill. 2001) (discussing the strong duty of loyalty attorneys owe their clients); Smyrna Developers, Inc. v. Bornstein, 177 So.2d 16, 18 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (stating "the attorney is under a duty at all times to represent his client and handle his client's affairs with
the utmost degree of honesty, forthrightness, loyalty and fidelity").
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confidences as well as the duty to represent in a timely and effective manner, to respond to the client's requests and to have no interest in the outcome of the representation. 72 But it would seem
this general attention to the duty of loyalty owed to the client
undercuts the importance of the client's confidences in a particular conflict issue. 73 This should not be confused with screening
individual disqualified lawyers within a firm, but rather is an
imputed disqualification of the entire firm where there is no
waiver.7 4
PART III-RESOLUTION OPTIONS: PREVENTION, WAIVER,
AND DISQUALIFICATION

Prevention and Waiver
Once a conflict is created there are options available to the attorney; some by judicial discretion, some which may come at the
behest of the attorney, some from the client.7 5 However, before
72 See Marc Pilcher, You're Killing George, When Professionalism and Business
Worlds Collide, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 829, 833 (1999) (suggesting the Code needs to be
revised in the duty of loyalty area because "the ambiguity and diversity in the test's application may be due to the difficulty in establishing whether the purpose of the test is to
preserve loyalty or indeed simply to protect clients' confidential information, as these two
goals are best served in different ways"). See generallyFrazier v. Boyle, 206 F.R.D. 480,
491 (E.D. Wis. 2002) (noting that the attorney owes a duty of loyalty notwithstanding the
fiduciary duty); Rafferty v. Scurry, 690 N.E.2d 104, 107 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (stating an
attorney's failure to respond to the client's requests is malpractice).
73 See generally Michael Edelman, Ethic: Flatt v. Superior Court of Sonoma County:
Attorney Withdrawal From ConcurrentRepresentations,35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1379,
1380 (1995) (stating the duty of loyalty is manifested in numerous ethical rules); Irene
Graves, Confidentialityand Conflicts of Interest: How Waiver Effects Ethical Duties, 22
J. LEGAL PROF. 267, 267 (1998) (explaining the differences between duty of confidentiality
and duty of loyalty); Kenneth F. Krach, Comment, The Client FraudDilemma: A Need
For Consensus, 46 MD. L. REV. 436, 451-54 (1987) (arguing that if the Model Rules require a lawyer to reveal a confidence under it can not be considered disloyalty).
74 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.10 cmt. 2 (2002) (discussing the principle of loyalty to clients and the fact that law firms are viewed as one lawyer for purposes
of disqualification); Atasi Corp. v.Seagate Tech., 847 F.2d 826, 829 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (noting the requirement for disqualifying an entire law firm if one member is disqualified);
Gaton v. Health Coalition Inc., 745 So.2d 510, 511 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (acknowledging the presumption that an entire firm is disqualified unless the firm can demonstrate
its "new associate has no actual knowledge of any confidential information material to the
case").
75 See Commonwealth Ins. Co. v. Graphix Hotline Inc., 808 F. Supp. 1200, 1208 (9th
Cir. 1992) (discussing factors to be considered when determining whether a client has
waived a potential conflict of interest); Trust Corp. of Montana v. Piper Aircraft Corp.,
701 F.2d 85, 87 (9th Cir. 1983) (noting the client's ability to waive any objection to a conflict of interest); Sapienza v. New York News Inc., 481 F. Supp. 676, 680 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)
(deciding that even with a client waiver, "the confidence and respect of the community
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the conflict is created there are preventive measures suggested
from case law and otherwise that can be taken to lessen the opportunity or fully protect the attorney-client relationship from
ever becoming conflicted in the first place including an advanced
computer system and the preventive waiver.
One such case-made adaptation to preventing potential conflicts from occurring is presently in place in every large law firm;
a networked computer database system connecting all offices of a
law firm which allows an attorney can enter a potential client's
name and receive an almost instantaneous response as to
whether the firm represents an adversary in an on-going litigation or continued transactional relationship. 76
However, the computerized network only alerts the firm of conflicts that may occur between existing clients and/or potential clients. 7 7 To avoid situations in which no potential conflict is
known, but one may occur over the course of the relationship, law
firms are allowed to warn clients ahead of time and request they
sign a waiver.7 8 Companies also have employed the waiver system to protect the lawyer from representing a party adverse to
the corporation's subsidiary.7 9
towards its bench and bar" requires disqualification).
76 See Analytica, Inc. v. NPD Research, 708 F.2d 1263, 1276 (7th Cir. 1983) (Coffey,
J., dissenting) (describing the mechanisms available to prevent such conflicts from arising); see also LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. Lake Props. Venture, 703 F.2d 252, 258 (7th Cir.
1983) (discussing the possibility of "screening" attorneys with conflicts to protect the entire firm from disqualification); Susan S. Fortney & Jett Hanna, Fortifying a Law FLrm's
EthicalInfrastructure:Avoiding Legal Malpractice Claims Based on Conflicts of Interest,
33 ST. MARY'S L. J. 669, 690 (2002) (noting the need for electronic database procedures to
prevent conflicts of interest).
77 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §126 cmt. b (2000) (advising attorneys not to enter business transaction with clients); Fortney & Hanna, supra
note 76, at 704 (noting an attorney's entrepreneurial activities are much more difficult to
check for conflicts). See generally Craig C. Albert, The Lawyer-Director:An Oxymoron, 9
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 413, 435-36 (1996) (discussing the disadvantages of having attorneys involved with the management aspects of business).
78 See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-732 (1993)
(validating use of a waiver for future conflicts of interests); Lerner, supra note 47, at 997
(advocating the use of prospective client waiver forms depending on the sophistication of
the client). But see Lawrence J. Fox, All's O.K Between ConsentingAdults: Enbghtened
Rule on Pznvacy, Obscene Rule on Ethics, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 701, 707 (warning attorneys that prospective client waiver forms should not be relied upon).
79 See Robert E. O'Malley et al., Mlisery, Malpractice,and Mail Fraud:Lawyers' Professional Liability in the 90's, ALAS Loss Prevention Manual C641 ALI-ABA 133, 180
(1991) (discussing the need to get a waiver of confidentiality to check for conflicts). See
generally Richard Painter, The Future of the Profession: A Symposium on Multidisciplinary Practice, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1399, 1430-31 (2000) (critiquing the waiver response);
William H. Simon, The Professional Responsibilities of the Public Official's Lawyer. A
Case Study From the Clinton Era, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 999, 1007-08 (2002) (detailing
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A preventive waiver offers the benefit of resolving the issue
ahead of time and averting a future denial of waiver.8 0 This
could become a point of leverage, as seen in Hypothetical II.
Similarly, law firms can advise their clients to create advance
waivers when contracting with their constituents, especially with
employment contracts.8 1 The question then arises what effect do
these options have on law firms, and how do they affect the client?
North Carolina opted to solve the problem by responding to the
ABA formal opinion allowing waivers for future conflicts of interest under particular circumstances. 82 In its opinion it describes
at what times future waivers are permissible, by setting forth
four requirements for the criteria of the waiver: 1) the waiver
must be in writing, 2) the waiver must acknowledge the conflict
was in contemplation by the parties and the time the waiver was
signed, 3) the waiver must clearly reflect the current representation will not be adversely affected by the subsequent representation, and 4) the waiver must stipulate information will not be
disclosed or used. 8 3 In other words the engagement letter is not a
White House Counsel Bernard Nussbaum's reliance on the waiver doctrine).
80 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R 1.9 (2002) (requiring consent after consultation); see also Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 167 n.2 (1988) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (commenting on the difficulty of appraising potential conflicts ahead of time, especially in criminal trials); Lerner, supra note 47, at 988 (explaining a prospective client
waiver is the only way to prevent future conflicts).
81 See Unified Sewage Agency v. Jelco, Inc., 646 F.2d 1339, 1346 n.6 (9th Cir. 1981)
(holding advance waivers valid, allowing simultaneous representation of multiple clients,
and noting the client may be estoppped from revoking his consent over time); see also
Painter, supra note 45, at 299 (arguing a narrower interpretation of the Jelco holding and
also noting that the successive conflict standard measures representation against similarities in litigation, whereas the stricter concurrent standard measures representation
against the duty of undivided loyalty). But see Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee
Corp., 580 F.2d 1311, 1321-22 (7th Cir. 1978) (noting there can be no distinction in required disclosure for more sophisticated firms even though they will incur a higher burden altogether).
82 See North Carolina State Bar, Op. RPC 168 (1994) (allowing prospective waivers
under certain circumstances); RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF THE NORTH
CAROLINA STATE BAR ch. 2 R. 5.1 (West 2002) (modeling state rules after the ABA rules).
See generallyEric J. Murdock, Finaly,Ethics as if People Mattered-Some Thoughts on
the Ethics Reform Act 1989, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 502, 509-11 (1990) (describing the
waiver option as a mitigation mechanism).
83 See NATIONAL REPORTER ON LEGAL ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES,
North Carolina Formal and Informal Opinions, Revised Proposed RPC 168, Jan. 13, 1994,
ABA Ethics 2000 recommendation (outlining when lawyers in North Carolina may obtain
advance waivers of conflict of interests); see also Ethics 2000, available at,
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k-rulel7rem.html (last visited Mar. 2003). The ABA Ethics
2000 Committee formerly adopted the written requirement for waivers in Feb. 2002. The
Committee's comments regarding the writing requirement under Model Rule 1.7 are
available at this site. Cf Eiger & Rutan, supra note 44, at 949 (noting California's higher
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definitive sign of waiver; one must look to the "particular circumstance" of the relationship, particularly client expectations. 84
The advanced waiver including responsive recourse creates
some problems. Because the lawyer cannot be held responsible
for knowing all possible conflicts, an advance waiver will never
fully cover all situations and the attorney has no knowledge of
whether one company intends to use the waiver as leverage
against another company.8 5 The resolution to both issues comes
from the answer to the question at what point should the lawyer
ask for the waiver? 86
In creating the attorney-client relationship, both parties must
negotiate their own ideas when coming together. 87 The client
standard of requiring advanced written waivers for potential or actual conflicts).
84 See North Carolina Formal and Informal Opinions; Waiver of Objection to a Possible Future Conflict of Interest, Revised Proposed RPC 168, Jan. 13, 1994. ABA Ethics
2000 recommendation:
The impetus for seeking prospective waivers has grown as the nature of both law
firms and clients has changed. In an era when law firms operated in just one location, when there were few mega-conglomerate clients and when clients typically
hired only a single firm to undertake all of their legal business, the thought of seeking prospective waivers rarely arose. However, when corporate clients with multiple operating divisions hired tens if not hundreds of law firms, the idea of that, for
example, a corporation in Miami retaining the Florida office of a national law firm
to negotiate a lease should preclude that firm's New York office from taking an adverse position in a totally unrelated commercial dispute against another division of
the same corporation strikes some as placing unreasonable limitations on the opportunities of both clients and lawyers.
Although the opinion continues by endorsing the view that such a situation presented a
conflict, it recognizes that there was nothing in the example that should prevent a prospective waiver from being effective. See generallyPainter,supra note 45, at 312-13 (positing that ambiguous waivers or waivers signed without counsel should be reviewed for
reasonableness by courts); Fred C. Zacharias, Waiving Conflict of Interests, 108 YALE L.J.
407, 416-17 (1998) (explaining that judges will not honor a client waiver if the client had
insufficient information when signing the waiver).
85 See Michael Lubowitz, The Right to Counsel of Choice After Wheat v. United
States: Whose Choice Is It 39 AM. U. L. REV. 437, 466 (noting the Court in Wheat stated
that difficulties in foreseeing potential conflicts may invalidate waivers). See, e.g., Kalish,
supra note 37, at 91 (stating it is unreasonable for attorneys to be expected to know who
their future clients will be with adverse interests to current clients). See generallyRichmond, supra note 23, at 422 (arguing that circumstances change between the time when
lawyers initially obtain waivers and when conflicts arise).
86 See Rotunda, supra note 27, at 230-31 (arguing corporate clients should list affiliates on waivers at the beginning of the representation). See generally Robert Hacker &
Ronald Rotunda, Standing, Waiver, Laches and Appealabilityin Attorney Disqualfication
Cases, 3 CORPORATION L. REV. 82 (1980) (explaining that attorneys must practice caution
when dealing with possible conflicts of interest); Zacharias, supra note 84, at 419 (noting
that many jurisdictions will require lawyers to have obtained additional waivers once conflicts actually arise).
87 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (prohibiting attorneys from concurrent representation of clients with adverse interests). See generallyRichard W. Painter,
Rules Lawyers Play By, 76 N Y.U L. REV. 665, 683 (2001) (emphasizing how the client is
in a better positions to chose the rules when contracting with attorneys). But see Kalish,
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must ask himself if this attorney will serve to his advantage at
all times; the attorney, on the other hand, must attempt to foresee and prevent all possible conflicts that could arise out of a relationship with this particular client depending on the circumstances of the representation.8 8 If the attorney asks the client to
sign a waiver to an as-yet-unknown conflict, the client may not
want the representation at all. 89 In multiple representation
cases where the potential for conflict is even higher, the attorney
is required to consider all his other clients. 90 This includes the
clients' transactional cases, litigation issues, affiliated companies
and each client's opponents. 9 1 Difficulty arises when the client is
asked to waive an as-yet unknown conflict, simply because one
may occur in the future.92
supra note 37 at 64-65 (criticizing the broad interpretation of client-attorney relationships
under freedom of contract terms).
88 See Kalish, supra note 37, at 67 (highlighting the lawyers' duties in finding future
conflicts of interest as required under Model Rule 1.7). See generallyGreg Zipes, Fostering Ethics in Complex Litigation, 34 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 53, 55 (2000) (explaining how
attorneys are extensions of their client's wishes and may not jointly represent two clients
with adverse interests); Lubowitz, supranote 85, at 466-67 (arguing courts do not require
attorneys to have foreseen all possible conflicts at the time waivers are drawn up).
89 See Pasman, supra note 52, at 173 (commenting on how clients practice discretion
in choosing which attorneys to use if they do not wish to sign waivers). See generally
Lerner, supra note 47, at 1006 (proposing that "sophisticated" clients who disagree to
signing waivers will seek other attorneys for representation). But see Fox, supra note 78,
at 716-17 (arguing existing clients who seek attorneys to represent them in different matters will have no other choice but to sign new preventative waivers).
90 See In re Lanza, 322 A.2d 445, 448 (N.J. 1974) (emphasizing the attorney's role in
foreseeing conflict and stating "it is utterly insufficient simply to advise a client that he,
the attorney, foresees no conflict of interest and then to ask the client whether the latter
will consent to the multiple representation. This is no more than an empty form of words.
A client cannot foresee and cannot be expected to foresee the great variety of potential
areas of disagreement that may arise..."). See generally Erik J. Bohlman, Financing
Strategies:Long Term Care for the Elderly,2 ELDER L.J. 167, 191 (suggesting that elder
law attorneys should fully explain "every potential conflict of interest" to each party);
John S. Dzienkowski, PositionalConflict of Interests, 71 TEX. L. REV. 457, 459 (1993) (explaining how law firms must consider conflicts with former and current clients).
91 See Gretchen L. Jankowski, The Ethics Involved in RepresentingMultiple Parties
in a Business Transaction:How to Avoid Being Caught Between Scylla and Charybdis
Within the Confmes of the MarylandDisciplinaryRules, 23 U. BALT. L. REV. 179, 210-11
(1993) (critiquing real estate transactions involving multiple representations and comparing the unilateral waiver approach according to New Jersey and South Carolina);
Dzienkowski, supra note 90, at 459-61 (listing possible "positional conflicts of interests"
that may arise which attorneys in law firms must consider); John A. Walton, Conflicts for
Sports and EntertainmentAttorneys: The GoodNews, the Bad News, and the Ugly Consequences, 5 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L. J. 259, 271-72 (listing Professor Geoffrey Hazard's
"four factors of a transaction" that attorneys should evaluate when considering multiple
client representation).
92 See Jankowski, supranote 91, at 272 (advocating full disclosure of all possible conflicts); see also Painter, supra note 87, at 705 (stating that waivers of "general and openended conflicts" may not be upheld because clients may not have fully understood the
ramifications). See generally Fox, supra note 78, at 716 (finding difficulty with clients
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One example that has arisen in corporate transactions occurs
when an attorney counsels a corporation with numerous subsidiaries and parent corporations. The attorney may seek to have
employees of company X waive their rights to sue both company
X and parent corporation Y as a condition of employment. 9 3
Another common situation occurs when clients and their business partners together seek counsel to discuss confidential information concerning their business transactions with an attorney. If the business relationship fails, the former partner's
presence breaks the confidentiality of the matter discussed. 94
This issue could have been prevented had the clients signed a
waiver form, allowing one side to be represented in case of termination of the business relationship. 95 Similar to a prenuptial
agreement, in the sense that such a waiver takes a precautionary
role in case of dissolution, such a request may not conform to the
client's concept of attorney fidelity. 96
agreeing to advance waivers because they may not foresee problems).
93 See Stratagem Dev. Corp. v. Heron Int'l N.V., 756 F. Supp. 789, 792-93 (S.D.N.Y.
1991) (stating the duty in New York Canon 5 applies, "with equal force where the client is
a subsidiary of the entity to be sued"); Kalish, supra note 37, at 69 (arguing waivers must
be signed by both the parent company and its subsidiary to avoid any future conflicts).
See generally Conflicts of Interests Issues, 50 BUS. LAW. 1381, 1389 (1995) (concluding
that written agreements should be entered into with the parent company and its subsidiaries to minimize potential conflicts).
94 See Samuel R. Miller et al., Coni'cts of Interest in CorporateLitigation, 48 BUS.
LAW 141 (1992) (discussing how former partners will attempt to obtain information from
the lawyer that represented partnership). See generally Robert W. Hilman, Business
Partnersas Fiduciaries.Reflections on the Limits of the Doctrine,22 CARDozo L. REV. 51,
55 (arguing that business partnerships have an "inherent conflict of interest" and therefore business partners cannot serve as fiduciaries); Painter, supra note 45, at 314 (noting
a lawyer will face conflict if a former partner of a joint venture seeks representation during a break-up).
95 See Responsible Citizens v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 756, 758 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1993) (holding "that an attorney representing a partnership does not necessarily
have an attorney-client relationship with an individual partner for purposes of applying
the conflict of interest rules. Whether such a relationship exists turns on finding an
agreement, express or implied, that the attorney also represents the partner."). See, e.g.,
Regina Stango Kelbon et al., Conflicts, The Appointment of "Professionals,"& Fiduciary
Duties of Major Partiesin Chapter 11, 8 BANK DEV. J. 349, 422-23 (1991) (arguing that
waivers would have prevented conflicts from arising in In Re Davenport Partnership
Ltd.); Eiger & Rutan, supra note 44, at 946 (noting courts have found conflicts when attorneys represent clients with adverse interests within a partnership).
96 See Alison J. Chen & Jonathon Sambur, Are ConsensualRelationship Agreements
a Solution to Sexual Harassmentin the Workplace 17 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 165,
166-67 (1999) (discussing the recent emergence of Consensual Relationship Agreements
in workplace litigation). See generally Fox, supra note 78, at 717 (fearing prospective
waivers will lead lawyers to choose clients based on higher fees thereby using prospective
waivers for their own best interest and not their clients'). But see Fred Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IOWA L. REV. 351, 368 (arguing clients will trust lawyers
more if lawyers are more informative "at the outset of the relationship").
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While the Code assumes the waiver to be in writing, and logically it should be for evidentiary purposes, it is not always manfested that way.9 7 A generally accepted practice is an oral acknowledgment that the attorney for the adversary has previously
represented your client.98 Other conflict of interest situations
have received public backlash for non-written waivers. 99
The enforcement of oral waivers also poses problems.1 0 0 Although no court decisions have definitively outlined their validity, because oral waivers are considered settled practice, there is
no reason not to accept them, unless the client was insufficiently
informed to make a rational decision.l1l Some even argue there
is no cause to be overly protective of a corporate client because it
is doubtful that one would be so naive as to be put in a position in
which it could be taken advantage of. 102
97 According to Willke, Farr & Gallagher partner John S. D'Alimonte, a general practice is to orally waive the other party's counsel. It has yet to be seen how the Supreme
Court would rule on the enforceability of an oral waiver, however decisions in other cases
suggest it is acceptable. See generally Henderson v. Smith, 903 F.2d 534, 537 (8th Cir.
1990) (upholding the validity of an orally waived concurrent conflict in criminal trial); Rotunda, supra note 27, at 230-31 (arguing against per se rules of conflicting interests where
there is no substantial relationship between the two issues). But see Lerner, supra note
47, at 1000 (positing that the lawyer trying to enforce an oral waiver would have a heavy
burden of proof).
98 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (a)(2) (1983) (allowing concurrent
representation where the client consents after consultation); see also id. at cint. 5 (suggesting a catch-22 where one client refuses to consent to the disclosure); id. at R. 1.9 (a)
(1983) (allowing subsequent representation but requiring the former client's consent after
consultation).
99 See United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 528-29 (1985) (holding a defendant's
failure to assert his right sufficed as a waiver because of the "everyday practicalities of
conducting a trial"); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979) (noting "an oral
waiver.., is not.., necessary or sufficient to establish waiver"); see also Edward J.
Boyer, Defense in Denny Case Seeks New Judge: John W Ouderkirk's Relationship with
Former Distr. Atty. Ira Reiner's Executive Secretary Is Cited as a Conflict of Interest,
L.A. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1993, at B I (reporting judicial conflict and suggesting an oral waiver
is insufficient).
100 See Lerner, supra note 47, at 999 (pointing out the "uphill battle" attorneys face
when attempting to enforce an oral waiver). Cf Beth A. Eisler, Modification of Sales Contracts Under the Uniform Commercial Code: Section 2-209 Reconsidered, 57 TENN. L.
REv. 401, 409 n.57 (1990) (remarking that alternatives are available to attorneys before
they should rely on oral waivers); Larry E. Ribstein, A Critique of the Uniform Limited
Liability Company Act, 25 STETSON L. REV. 311, 353-54 (1995) (noting that enforcement
of oral waivers in any scenario can add complications and raise concerns).
101 See Zacharias, supra note 84, at 417 (describing California's rationale for setting
aside a client's consent where the client was considered unsophisticated). See generally
Kelly v. Greason, 244 N.E.2d 456, 462 (N.Y. 1968) (contending that an unsophisticated
client in a complex transaction may not be able to comprehend the ramifications of the
conflict of interest despite explicit explanation); Lerner, supra note 47, at 996 (discussing
the relationship between informed consent and memorialization of oral waivers).
102 See Lee A. Pizzimenti, The Lawyer's Duty to Warn Clients About Limits on Confidentiality, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 441, 485 n.201 (1990) (asserting that corporate officers
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On the contrary, corporate sophistication has increased, and
the savvy client may be well equipped to fend off attorneys seeking to manipulate a waiver from them. 103 The Ethics Committee
has recognized these developments and addressed the changes
that have taken place in legal practice. 104
Disqualification and Screening
Where an attorney that formerly represented a client moves
firms and finds the new firm representing a client adverse to the
attorney's former client, the Rules suggest a conflict exists and
disqualification of the representing law firm is necessary. 0 5
However, case law supports screening the attorney with knowledge as an alternative.10 6 Both preserve the two stated functions
usually possess more sophistication than individual clients); see also Michael D. Morrison
& James R. Old, Jr., Economic, Exigencies and Ethics: Whose Choice? Emerging Trends
in Texas Insurance Defense Practice, 53 BAYLOR L. REV. 349, 396 (2001) (commenting
that restrictions on the corporate practice of law are meant to protect the public from scenarios which would permeate the attorney-client privilege); Mark Spiegel, Article, The
Case of Mrs. Jones Revisited Paternalism and Autonomy in Lawyer-Client Counseling,
1997 B.Y.U. L. REV. 307, 308 (1997) (arguing that corporate clients usually dictate decision-making schemes to their attorneys instead of the other way around).
103 See Audrey I. Benison, Note, The Sophisticated Client: A Proposalfor the Reconciliation of Conflicts of Interest Standards for Attorneys and Accountants, 13 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 699, 727 (2000) (contrasting the levels of judicial scrutiny afforded to individual client waivers and corporate client waivers); see also James R. Harvey III, ConstructionLaw, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 827, 833 (1999) (noting that interactions between corporate parties are usually at arm's length due to the respective sophistication of each);
Lerner, supra note 47, at 1005 (pointing to the Ethics 2000 differentiation of sophisticated
and unsophisticated clients).
104 See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-372 (1993)
(noting "the ethical permissibility and effectiveness of a lawyer's obtaining in advance
from a present or prospective client a waiver of a conflict of interest that might arise in
the future"); YourABA: The Score So Far,87 A.B.A. J. 81 (2001) (noting which provisions
suggested by the Commission were accepted and which suggestions were rejected). See
generally Charles F. Wolfram, Comparative Multi-DisciplinaryPractice of Law: Paths
Taken and Not Taken, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 961, 962 (2002) (noting that corporate
clients have been a major force driving change in the public arena).
105 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.9 (b) (1983) (noting that an attorney
must obtain informed consent in writing before divulging any information acquired
through previous client interactions); see also id. at cmt. 5 (limiting the application of 1.9
(b) to lawyers or firms with knowledge or information regarding a particular client). See
generallyDavid H. Taylor, Conflicts ofInterest and the Indigent Client: Barring the Door
to the Last Lawyer in Town, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 577, 578 (1995) (suggesting that a disqualifying conflict of interest may limit the availability of legal services to clients less financially solid than corporations).
106 See Analytica, Inc. v. NPD Research, 708 F.2d 1263, 1267 (7th Cir. 1983) (noting
one exception to the "substantial relationship" rule is avoiding disqualification by showing
effective measures were taken to prevent disclosure to the lawyers); Novo Terapeutisk
Laboratorium A/S v. Baxter Travenol Labs., 607 F.2d 186, 197 (7th Cir. 1979) (arguing
the presumption of shared confidences between a firm's members is rebuttable); Freeman
v. Chicago Musical Instrument, 689 F.2d 715, 723 (7th Cir. 1982) (remarking that an attorney will rebut the presumption of shared confidences if he can clearly and effectively
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of the Rule, namely client confidentiality and avoiding positions
adverse to the client. 107
Disqualification fully bars both the attorney and the attorney's
firm from continuing the representation.108 The Rules recognize
this is a harsh result and offer the considerations involved in
Comment 3, including loyalty to the former client, unrestricting
the present client to choose representation and freedom of lawyers to change jobs.109 Screening, on the other hand, requires
mechanisms be put in place by the law firm to protect the attorney who represented the former client from coming in contact
with information regarding the present litigation.e10 A further
issue comes with the time, energy and cost incurred from litigatshow that he had no knowledge of the confidences).
107 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.9 cmt. 1 (1983) (stating the lawyer
owes a continuing duty of confidentiality and protection from conflicts of interest to her
client even after terminating the relationship); In re Corn Derivatives Antitrust Litig.,
748 F.2d 157, 162 (3rd Cir. 1984) (explaining the purposes of Rule 1.9 include prevention
against betrayal of client confidences, public confidence in the integrity of the bar, and the
client's right to loyalty). See generally Oxford Sys. v. CellPro, Inc., 45 F. Supp. 2d 1055,
1065 n.4 (W.D. Wash. 1999) (stating, "the principle underlying all conflict of interest rules
is duty of loyalty and confidentiality to the client").
108 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.9 cmt. 4-9 (1983) (discussing the ramifications of lawyers that switch firms). See generally Bruce A. Green, Doe v. Grievance
Committee: On the Interpretationof Ethical Rules, 55 BROOKLYN L. REV. 485, 542 n.197
(1989) (explaining the effect of disqualification as a mandatory withdrawal from representation); Andrew P. Romshek, Comment, The Nebraska Bright Line Rule: The Automatic
Disqualiicationof a Law Firm Due to a New Lawyer's or Nonlawyer's PriorAffiliations
... Sensible Solution or Serious Setback, 28 CREIGHTON L. REV. 213, 240-41 (1994)
(examining the effects of disqualification on the attorney's firm, the attorney, and the client). But see Am. Special Risk Ins. Co. v. Delta Am. Re Ins. Co., 634 F. Supp. 112, 121
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (advising that "the substantial relationship test is inapplicable to situations where a law firm's alleged disqualification arises out of simultaneous representation
of two clients if each client was aware of the other's relationship to the firm and had no
reason to believe that the confidences of one party would be withheld from the other").
109 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.9 cmt. 3 (1983) (offering scenarios in
which a lawyer may or may not represent a client with an adverse interest to a former
client); see also Mary Helen McNeal, Having One Oar or Being Without a Boat: Reflections on the Fordham Recommendations on Limited Legal Assistance, 67 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2617, 2627 n.52 (1999) (suggesting that a lawyer must consult a former client when
representing a new client with possible adverse interests). But see Randy Lee, Related
Representationsin Civil and CriminalMatters: The Night the DA. Ditched His Date for
the Prom,29 N. Ky. L. Rev. 281, 305 (2002) (opining that a lawyer is presented with many
tempting opportunities to divulge the confidences of a former client).
110 See Drucker, supra note 45, at 549-50 (citing several factors that can be used
when determining if a screen was or will be effective); Jeremy P. White, Establishinga
CapitalDefense Unitin Virginia:A Proposalto Increase the Qualityof Representationfor
Indigent CapitalDefendants, 13 CAP. DEF. J. 323, 355 n.204 (2001) (stating the five essential elements to effectively screen the attorney from the client's confidences). Cf Jacqueline St. Joan, BuildingBridges, Building Walls: CollaborationBetween Lawyers and
Social Workers in a Domestic Violence Clinic and Issues of Client Confidentiality, 7
CLINICAL L. REV. 403, 439 (2001) (speculating on the use of confidentiality walls to prevent inadvertent client confidence disclosure).
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ing to recover the fees paid to the disqualified attorney. Many
times the court costs to recover the fee surpass the amount
owed. II"
Post-Conflict and Waiver
After a conflict has been determined to exist, the attorney, according to the Rules, must inform the client and receive consent.1 1 2 Where it is a concurrent transactional basis, the consent
must come from both clients and where it occurs in a subsequent
transaction or litigation relationship for substantially related
matter, the attorney may have to gain consent from both the current and the former client.11 3 The difficulty that arises, as seen
in Hypothetical I, is the potential misuse of the power to reject a
waiver where the conflict exists technically but not substantively.
This happens when the client refuses to waive solely for the advantage it receives by forcing the adversary to seek new counsel,
which in turn may increase the chances of settling.114 The writIII See Analytica, 708 F.2d at 1267 (7th Cir. 1983) (ordering the disqualified law firm
to pay $25,000 where the cost to bring suit was $130,000). See generally Boyd, supranote
32, at 24-25 (stating that conflict rules that are too harsh will essentially result in imposing heavier costs of litigation on clients instead of protection of their confidences); Catherine L. Fisk, Union Lawyers and Employment Law, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 57,
100 (2002) (stating that disqualification of counsel raises the costs of litigating, in addition to delaying the discovery process).
112 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (stating that if an attorney does not
receive consent, then she shall not represent that client); See generallyLauren R. Frank,
Ethical Responsibilities and the InternationalLawyer: Mind the Gaps, 2000 U. ILL. L.
REV. 957, 975, n.132 (stating that the U.S. generally imposes on lawyers broad duties to
inform clients of conflicts, in contrast to the European model where lawyers are given
more deference to evaluate whether consent is necessary); Pamela Phillips, Trends in IP
Malpractice Claims and How to Avoid Them, 717 PLI/PAT 621, 666 (2002) (stating that
the House adopted the Ethics Commission's proposal that consent under Rules 1.7 and 1.9
be confirmed in writing).
113 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R 1.7 (stating that both clients must give
consent, confirmed by writing). See generally Stacy L. Brustin, Legal Services Provision
Through Multidisciplinary Practice - Encouraging Holistic Advocacy Whle Protecting
Ethical Interests, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 787, 849 (2002) (noting the three types of conflicts
under Model Rules, concurrent, successive, and imputed); Anne N. Walker, Defending
Constructive Dischargeof Plaintiffs in Sexual Harassment Cases and Ethical Issues in
Representing the Accused Employee, 676 PLI/LIT 467, 486-87 (2002) (noting that although Rule 1.7 permits lawyers to obtain consent, there are some situations lawyers
must be aware of that are nonconsentable, where representation is prohibited).
114 See In re Kelly, 23 N.Y.2d 368, 374-79 (1968) (holding the policy against suing a
present client is unwaivable); id at 378 (suggesting times where "[blecause the relationships or interests create a substantial likelihood of profound conflict, or for other policy
reasons, representation is not permitted under any circumstances"); In re A. & B., 44 N.J.
331, 335 (1965) (holding a waiver insufficient for conflicted government lawyers representing adversaries of their client). See generally Daniel C. Tepstein, Confirming an
Amended Labor Arbitration Award in FederalCourt: The Problem of Functus Officio, 8
AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 65, 73 (stating that the Model Rules' purpose is defeated when used
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ers of the Code foresaw this very potential for abuse and warned
of it. 115 Some courts have heeded similar advice where the result
would lead to dilatory effects.11 6 However, while courts tend to
err on the side of over-protection of the client, they admit conflicts such as these are fact-specific. 117
Because waivers have a settled place in the attorney-client
business relationship, attention must be paid to how they should
be allowed to be used, at what point in the relationship does requiring a client to sign a waiver become unfair to the client, or to
the attorney, and how a system such as this can be utilized without being abused.I's Some suggest an education system for attorneys, but maybe all that is required is guidance from the Ethas "procedural swords").
115 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R 1.7, cmt. 15 (stating the "objection [to
waive] should be viewed with caution, however, for it can be misused as a technique of
harassment"). See generallyLyon & Philips, supra note 51, at 73-74 (suggesting a push to
settle reaches the client's substantive rights and therefore the rules of ethics may be subject to the Erie doctrine); Carrie E. Johnson, Rocket Dockets: Reducing Delay in Federal
Civil Litigation, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 225, 230-31 (1997) (describing three problems arising
from obstruction of justice due to delay, including producing unfair settlements).
116 See Pennwalt Corp. v. Plow, Inc., 85 F.R.D. 264, 274 (Del. 1980) (finding efforts to
turn Code Canons into "litigation tactic[s]" when an attorney sought withdrawal "troubling"); In Re Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 17 B.R. 288, 292 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) (finding the appearance of impropriety of a potential conflict outweighs the client's right to
choose his own counsel); Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 163 (1988) (recognizing
that although the government could "manufacture" a conflict to create a disqualification,
no per se rule against it is necessary).
117 In Teradyne, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., No. C-91-0344 MHP ENE, 1991 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 8363 N.D. Cal. June 6, 1991), the court disqualified the attorneys representing Teradyne Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of Hewlett-Packard, due to a lack of distinction between the two companies and cited Formal Opinion No. 1989-113 of State Bar of
California's Standing Committee on Professional Responsibility and Conduct which interprets California's version of Model Rules. The court held that representation is allowed
where "(1) the attorney has not represented and does not now represent the subsidiary,
(2) the subsidiary is not the 'alter-ego' of the parent corporation, and (3) there is no adversity between the corporation and the subsidiary on the subject of the representation." See
id. at *8. See generallyHartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 721 F. Supp. 534,
538 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (stating that courts generally do not disqualify counsel solely based
on violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility); Ethics & Issues, HAW. B.J., Jan.
5, 2001, at 20 (stating that because conflicts are fact specific, clients may not consent to
unknown conflicts in advance).
118 See Jon J. Kramer, Dead Men's Lawyers Tell No Tales: The Attorney-Client Privilege Survives Death, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 941, 945 n.22 (citing Martin v. Lauer,
686 F.2d 24, 32-33 (D.C. Cir. 1982), and reinforcing that unless there is an abuse or a
waiver, the legal system affords attorney-client communications great protection). See
generally Ken M. Zeidner, Inadvertent Disclosure and the Attorney-Client Privilege:
Looking to the Work-Product Doctrine for Guidance, 22 CARDOzO L. REV. 1315, 1332
(2001) (stating that sometimes fairness demands that a waiver be implied in situations
where one party seeks to abuse the attorney-client privilege); Inadvertent Disclosure of
Privileged or Confidential Documents, COL. LAW., Sept. 2001 (stating that clients who
enter into attorney-client relationships should not fear that an inadvertent error could
lead them to waive their privilege).
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ics Committee in addressing these issues.1 1 9
PART IV - APPLICATION OF THE RULES
How the Law Firms areAffected
Ostensibly one would assume the legal code should adapt to
the issues and potential abuses the Code allows, but this is not
necessarily what happens. Remaining with the status quo of the
Rules as they stand will allow the corporate world to control the
situations and resolutions.120 The simple solution of a law firm
bowing out of a potential client relationship effectively stems the
law firm's ability to pursue the main focus for which it was created, namely to work.121 While the debate continues concerning
to what extent it is acceptable to refer to a law firm as a job, it is
22
only that, a job.1
119 See Julie Davies, FederalCivil Rights in the 1990s: The DichotomyBetween Reality and Theory, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 197, 217 (1997) (observing that from the client's perspective, a great emphasis should be placed on the client's education and knowledge of the
litigation); see also John A. Edginton, ManagingLawyers' Risks at the Millennium, 73
TUL. L. REV. 1987, 1996 (1999) (promoting educational programs and risk-management
programs to reduce the occurrence of conflicts of interests and address permissible times
for waiver use); Deborah L. Rhode, InstitutionalizingEthics, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
665, 701 (1994) (suggesting that organizations could improve the ethical conduct of lawyers by implementing education programs that put into practice reward structures).
120 See Pilcher, supra note 72, at 829 (stating that growth in legal representation and
firm size has exposed deficiencies and ambiguities of certain aspects of the Model Rules);
see also Sonia S. Chan, Double Billing, Paddingand OtherForms of Overbilling,9 GEo. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 611, 636-37 (1996) (arguing that the ABA should implement new transparency rules because the legal profession has failed to sufficiently monitor its ethical duty to
clients with regard to billing practices); Heather A. Wydra, Keeping Secrets Within the
Team: MaintainingClient Confidentiality While Offering InterdisciplinaryServices to the
Elderly Client, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1517, 1534-35 (1994) (explaining some insufficiencies
of the Code and the Model Rules).
121 See Cinema 5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc. 528 F.2d 1384, 1387 (2d Cir. 1976) (relying
on the substantial relation test to determine successive conflicts of interest, but measuring the conflict against the duty of undivided loyalty for current client conflicts). See generallyPilcher,supranote 72, at 830-31 (noting the "substantially related" test is the focal
point of Rule 1.9, but its implications have produced some confusion); Gregory C. Sisk,
Iowa's Legal Ethics Rules - It's Time to Join the Crowd, 47 DRAKE L. REV. 279, 287 (stating that frequent criticism of the Code focused on its failure to differentiate between lawyers in different roles, instead of on litigators).
122 See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 368 (1977). The Court described
the thought process behind 'professionalism' by stating commercializing the legal field
"will undermine the attorney's sense of dignity and self-worth. The hustle of the marketplace will adversely affect the profession's service orientation, and irreparably damage the
delicate balance between the lawyer's need to earn and his obligation selflessly to serve."
Summarizing, Justice Blackmun concluded "the argument presumes that attorneys must
conceal from themselves and from their clients the real-life fact that lawyers earn their
livelihood at the bar. We suspect that few attorneys engage in such self-deception." Id.
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The argument toward categorizing the legal arena as a profession comes from a desire to differentiate it from a trade. 2 3 Elements that seem to set the two apart include profit-motivation,
the adversarial nature of the field, how the public views the legal
124
field, and lawyer's ability to advertise services.
Client solicitation is addressed in the Model Rules and has
been addressed in several Supreme Court decisions.125 In her
dissent in Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass 2., 126 Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor said because the legal field is a profession and
widely accepted as focused on the client's interest, lawyers should
not be allowed to solicit their services, when in fact the driving
force behind solicitation is the lawyer's pecuniary interest.127
See generallyBetina A. Suessmann, Subjective and Objective: You Can't Have One Without the Other: A Recommendation for Model Rule 7.3, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 229, 235 n.50
(1999) (citing the Canons of Professional Ethics, Canon 27 (1908) which states, "solicitation of business by... personal communications, or interviews, not warranted by personal
relations, is unprofessional").
123 See Norman Bowie, The Law: From a Profession to a Business, 41 VAND. L. REV.
741, 759 (1988) (arguing that it is detrimental for the legal profession to operate in a
business-like manner because of the dangers of losing its sense of altruism and values);
Pilcher, supra note 72, at 829 (observing the debate over whether the legal profession is
considered a trade or a business has been put in the spotlight due to the growth of the legal profession and its increased entanglement in the needs and competitiveness of the
business world); Russell G. Pearce, The ProfessionalismParadigmShift: Why Discarding
ProfessionalIdeology Will Improve the Conduct and Reputation of the Bar,70 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 1229, 1230 (1995) (asserting that a crisis facing the legal profession can be used as
an opportunity to shift the legal paradigm more toward public service with a higher quality of service to clients).
124 See Bowie, supra note 123, at 743 (stating that an "altruistic spirit" is one factor
that distinguishes the legal profession); Trina Jones, InadvertentDisclosure ofPrivileged
Information and the Law of Mistake: UsingSubstantive Legal Principlesto Guide Ethical
Decision Making, 48 EMORY L.J. 1255, 1295 n. 137 (1999) (stating what historically distinguished a trade from a profession was that a profession follows higher standards than
that which is dictated by law). But see Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 371-72
(1977) (stating "the belief that lawyers are somehow 'above' trade has become an anachronism").
125 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R 7.3 (a) (stating "A lawyer shall not inperson or live telephone contact solicit professional employment from a prospective client
with whom the lawyer has no family or prior professional relationship when a significant
motive for the lawyer's doing so is the lawyer's pecuniary gain"). See generally Shapero v.
Kentucky Bar Ass'n., 486 U.S. 466, 491 (1988) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing severe
restraints on attorney advertising are necessary for preserving professionalism); Zauder
v. Office of Disc. Counsel of Supreme Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 637-38, 642 (1985) (holding that attorney advertisements consisting of illustrations, fee terms, and advice are
permissible insofar as they are truthful and non-deceptive); Ohrlik v. Ohio State Bar
Ass'n., 436 U.S. 447 (1978) (affirming disciplinary measures against an attorney for aggressively soliciting two accident victims as it did not offend First Amendment rights);
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 363, 384 (1977) (holding the Arizona Bar Association's disciplinary rule restricting advertising by attorneys does not violate the
Sherman Act but does violate First Amendment rights).
126 486 U.S. 466 (1988).
127 See id. at 481-82 (differentiating between the legal profession and standardized
consumer products); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R 7.3 (a) (prohibiting attorney
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From the viewpoint of the lay public, the legal field's professional
standards have dropped, leaving a sense of unprofessionalism in
its wake. 128
Although the Supreme Court has addressed the matter, it has
yet to resolve the issue and arguably the court system is not the
proper forum for the determination.29 More likely a representative group, like the Ethics Committee, made up of numerous attorneys representing a variety of backgrounds from across the
country should be the decision maker of such a relevant issue. 130
Whether this will translate into an overall sense that the legal
profession has also stepped down from a profession to a trade is
yet to be seen.
Similarly, resolution of the ethical questions posed in the hypothetical situations laid out in Part II of this essay may have to be
resolved by the answer to whether the legal field is a profession
or a trade. If it is a trade, attorneys will accept standards set by
others outside the legal arena, for instance from the business
world.131
solicitations where the primary motive is pecuniary gain); but see Bates, 433 U.S. at 36872 (questioning whether client solicitation truly diminishes legal professionals).
128 See Bates, 433 U.S. at 370-71 (suggesting that public cynicism toward the legal
profession may stem from the legal profession's disdain for advertising, yet encouragement of developing client contacts at social events); John C. Buchanan, Professionalismin
the Practice of Law, 28 VAL. U.L. REV. 563, 563-64 (1994) (comparing Justice Holmes
reference to the legal field, "of all secular professions this has the highest [standards]" to
former Vice President Dan Quayle's question, "does America really need 70% of the
world's lawyers?" to gauge public sentiment regarding lawyers); Allen K. Harris, The Professionalism Crisis - The "Z" Words and Other Rambo Tactics: The Conference of Chief
Justices' Solution, 53 S.C. L. REV. 549, 551 (2002) (discussing the harmful effects of
"Rambo lawyer tactics", unprofessional, and unethical conduct on the legal profession's
once positive image).
129 See Buchanan, supra note 128, at 567 (noting courts and disciplinary committees
have focused specifically on lawyer advertising); Harris, supra note 128, at 555 (noting
scarce judiciary and lawyering resources are wasted by addressing attorney professionalism concerns). But see Greg N. Anderson & Charles M. Kidd, ProfessionalResponsibility:
Survey of the Law of ProfessionalResponsibility,33 IND. L. REV. 1365, 1365 (2000) (noting that the Indiana Supreme Court has taken an active role in defining the lawyers' relation to the legal profession).
130 See generallyBuchanan, supranote 128, at 576-81 (noting the International Society of Primerus Law Firms was created to provide lawyers with internal policing standard
which resulting in a lawyer's seal of approval); Harris, supra note 128, at 560 (discussing
a study conducted by the National Conference of Chief Justices which was entirely devoted to addressing attorney professionalism concerns); N. Gregory Smith, Missed Opportunities.Louisiana's Version of the Rules of ProfessionalConduct, 61 LA. L. REV. 1, 1 (listing two sources that purport to address and comment on changes in the professional
conduct of lawyers).
131 See Buchanan, supra note 128, at 575 (cautioning that as the legal profession becomes more concerned with marketing and advertising than client service, it becomes
closer to a trade); Harris, supra note 128, at 588 (noting an ABA study claims attorneys
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The decision of whether the legal field is a profession or a trade
will affect who will determine how the conflict of interest issues
in the business world will be resolved. If the legal field is deemed
a profession, lawyers will continue to create their own ethical
rules and not be subjected to norms created outside of the profession. 132 If the trade rubric is superimposed and the state-adopted
Model Rules are used, potential clients will be cut off and the law
33
firms will suffer.
A presumption exists that law firms are well adept at gaining
new clientele; this may not be the case. In fact, logically, law
firms are continually cut out from representing their clients.134
This reverts the relationship back to the attorney-client relationship originally envisioned by the Code, but undercuts all the
achievements and growth in the legal and business worlds.13 5
On the one hand, one law firm representing one client would
ensure the most protection of each of the clients.136 Taken to the
operate now more than ever before as businessmen in industrial and financial marketplaces); W. Bradley Wendel, Morality,Motivation, and the ProfessionalismMovement, 52
S.C. L. REV. 557, 568-69 (2001) (noting the decline of the legal profession results in a once
elite profession opening itself up to common men).
132 See Buchanan, supra note 128, at 574 (proposing that a return to professionalism
will occur from within the profession based on a self-imposed set of standards); Samuel J.
Levine, Faith in Legal Professionalism:Believers and Heretics, 61 MD. L. REV. 217, 225
(2002) (describing the movement back to lawyers as professionals based on professionals
reviving the profession from within); Wendel, supra note 131, at 561-63 (explaining one
view of professionalism emphasizes self-imposed regulations).
133 See Jonathan R. Macy & Geoffrey P. Miller, An Economic Analysis of Conflict of
InterestRegulation, 82 IOWA L. REV. 965, 1005 n.43 (1997) (quoting the Model Code's Disciplinary Rule 5-101 governing conflict of interests); Levine, supra note 132, at 217-19
(supporting the position that the legal profession has now become more like a business);
Richmond, supra note 15, at 61 (noting the Model Code Section 1.7 addresses how attorneys should confront conflicts of interest).
134 See Analytica, Inc. v. NPD Research, 708 F.2d 1263, 1269 (7th Cir. 1983) (referring to Lindgren, Toward a New Standard of Attorney Disqualification,1982 AM. BAR
FOUND. RES. J. 419 (1982), to acknowledge that disqualification as a remedy has diminished because of its severity to current conflicts of interest); Richmond, supra note 15, at
60 (providing examples of clients forcibly being cut from representation due to conflict of
interests); Steinberg & Sharpe, supra note 46, at 1 (suggesting the growing trend of law
firms may impact client representation).
135 See Buchanan, supra note 128, at 575 (suggesting that the "spirit of public service" is the true essence of professionalism); Richmond, supranote 15, at 59 (noting that it
is the client to whom lawyers owe duties of loyalty and confidentiality); Jeffrey W. Stempel, A More Complete Look at Complexity, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 781, 787 (1998) (suggesting an
increased number of parties create more conflicts of interests).
136 See Anastasia M. Pryanikova, Successive Representation in Cross-BorderPractice: Global Ethics or Common RulesZ 10 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 325, 326
(2000) (proposing that successful attorney-client relationships protect clients by establishing mutual trust and confidence); Richmond, supra note 15, at 62 (recognizing Model Rule
1.7 requires that lawyers' duty to clients to be indivisible among multiple clients); Richmond, supra note 23, at 384 (implying representation of multiple clients impairs advo-
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extreme, large firms will be unable to represent multinational
business. This is due to two main effects occurring. First, the
prohibition against conflicted representation will have the harshest affect on the larger firms because these are the firms generally hired to represent the largest corporations.137 The larger the
pool of clients, the more conflict of interest situations will be created. Taking the Rules to the extreme would require law firms to
downsize in order to prevent continuous streams of conflicts with
38
current and subsequent clients.
Second, each law firm would effectively become an in-house
counsel for a handful of companies because strict application of
the Rules would reduce the size of law firms as well as the number of clients each law firm could effectively represent.139 Further, any efficiency brought on by "'specialized"' firms, i.e. ones
focused on an area of specialization like copyright or patent
firms, would be negated as they are forced to expand to provide
advice to their client on all realms of the their business. 140 Combined, these two factors would consequently infringe on the business world's ability for flexible representation.
The business world's growth, internationally and technologically requires representation for all facets of its problems. This
cacy).
137 See Richmond, supra note 15, at 62 (noting that Model Rule 1.7 prevents attorneys
who find themselves representing adverse interests from simply eliminating disfavored
clients without consent among parties). See generally Richmond, supra note 23, at 384-86
(positing a hypothetical conflict of interest that may threaten disqualification); Stempel,
supra note 135, at 796 (proposing a reduction in the complexity of litigation will enable
attorneys to be better advocates).
138 See Richmond, supra note 15, at 63 (explaining Model Rule 1.9 continues to protect client interests after attorney-client relationship terminates); Stempel, supra note
135, at 789 (suggesting over-lawyering in protracted cases only adds to already complex
legal issues); Wang, supra note 52, at 275 (clarifying that perpetual attorney-client relationships ensure both former clients and new clients receive maximum commitment).
139 See Randall S. Thomas et al., Megafirms,80 N.C. L. Rev. 115, 130 (2001) (explaining that conflicts rules constrain firm growth); see also Richard A. Epstein, The Legal
Regulation of Lawyers' Conflicts ofInterest, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 579, 586 (1992) (noting
that larger sized firms will encounter conflicts of interest rules). See generally Larry E.
Ribstein, Limited Liability Companies: PossibleFutures for UnincorporatedFirms,64 U.
CIN. L. REV. 319, 331 (1996) (showing that vicarious liability may force firms to avoid
risky clients or reduce firm size).
140 See Maria B. Rubin, Conflicts and the Corporate Client: Fact orFiction?,N.Y.L.J.
July 20, 1995 (disagreeing with the decision by the ABA Committee on Ethics to allow
multiple representation in some cases without both parties consent). See generallyRichard S. Gruner, The Role of the General Counsel: Perspective: General Counsel in an Era
of Compliance Programsand Corporate Self-Policing, 46 EMORY L.J. 1113, 1114 (1997)
(noting the use of general council). But see Michael Klausner et al., The Law and Economics of Lawyering: Second Opinions in Litigation, 84 VA. L. REV. 1411, 1427-28 (1998)
(showing how the use of a second opinion might prove useful).
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includes a law firm that can represent its client in other countries, and within its specialization. For example, the needs of a
multinational such as IBM constitute a broad span, ranging from
litigation expertise in patent and copyright law141 to representation during takeovers of small businesses.142 Obviously, a small
firm will not have the resources or manpower to supply the legal
needs for this company, however, a large firm will most likely be
blocked from representing IBM because of the conflict rules.
This exaggerated result displays the problem that will affect at
least a small percentage of law firms. Once it occurs, the effect
on the legal field by corporate business will be a collapse of legal
43
representation for those few corporate clients. 1
How the Client is Affected
A reversion to a situation where each client only has one lawyer overlooks the basis of the legal system, that it is the client's
decision who shall represent him in the legal arena and who will
serve as his agent.144 This fundamental principle is usurped, if
141 See John Haystead, Making the Right Moves; SemiconductorIndustry Moves Toward 300im Wafer Size; Industry Trend or Event, ELEC. Bus. TODAY, Feb. 1997 at 52
(describing the new technology multinational corporations are creating); see also Benison,
supra note 103, at 700 (noting the competing costs of conflicts of interest rules). See generally Stuart S. Prince, Note, The Bar Strikes Back: The ABA's Misguided Quash of the
MDP Rebellion, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 245, 250 (2000) (explaining the need for firms with
comprehensive services).
142 See John M. Broeker et al., Constructinga Legal Department: Findingthe Right
General Counsel Sets Tone for Success; In-House Attorneys Add Value Through Specialized Knowledge of Business, CORPORATE LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 1994 at 1 (discussing the importance of maintaining perspective and objectivity through in-house counsel); see also
Herbert M. Kritzer, The ProfessionsAre Dead, Long Live the Professions:Legal Practice
in a Postprofessional World, 33 LAw & SOCkY REV. 713, 730 (1999) (noting the geographic
widening of the market for professional services). See generally Epstein, supra note 139,
at 583 (discussing the implications of receiving confidential information from large corporate clients).
143 See Milton C. Regan, ProfessionalResponsibility and the Corporate Client, 13
GEO.J. LEGAL ETHICS 197, 208 (2000) (noting the complexity of corporate clients). See
generally D. Christopher Wells, Engagement Letters in TransactionalPractice: A Reporter's Reflection, 51 MERCER L. REV. 41, 48 (1999) (explaining problems with the law
profession and ethics); Stanley Pietrusiak, Jr., Comment, Changingthe Nature of Corporate Representation:Attorney Liabilityfor Aiding and Abetting the Breach of Fiduciary
Duty, 28 ST. MARY'S L.J. 213, 222 (1996) (indicating that lawyers are moving from individual clients to corporate clients).
144 See Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 162 (1988) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(holding, in criminal trials, a defendant may be denied counsel of choice if a co-defendant
could be called as witness against the defendant). See generally Paula Galowitz, Restrictions on Lobbying by Legal Services Attorneys: RedeiningProfessionalNorms and Obligations,4 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 39, 67 (noting clients choose their representation); Henry K.
Snyder, UpholdingForfeiture for Competition and Noncompete Provisions in Law Firm
PartnershipAgreements: Changing the Focus From the Client's Interests to the Clients'
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the client wishes to use a specialist in litigation for a particular
issue from one firm. 145
Unfortunately, courts interpreting the guidelines provide us
with an even more confusing picture of the Rules than the Rules
themselves offer. Can a law firm represent A, who is adverse to a

subsidiary of client B? Would the answer change if B is no longer
a current client but a former client? These questions need an-

swers more suitable to today's corporate world than what the
Model Rules offer.
Conclusion
Because of the changes in the legal profession and the business
world the Code may need to be updated. The Ethics 2000 Commission expansion of 1.7 shows attention to exactly this type of
problem,146 however they did not determine a problem existed in
this area.

From their alteration of a similar issue and omission

on this topic one could conclude they purposely intend to address
the new business relationship in this way. On the other hand,
had the commission envisioned this type of relationship, some
commentary delineating guidelines should have been included to
address the issues.

As it stands, there is no acknowledgment that a change has
taken place, creating an ambiguity and inconsistency in the
Rules. One suggestion is to create a Commission solely to review
how the Code has been altered by the business world.14 7 This
Interests,28 CONN. L. REV. 1259, 1279 (1996) (limiting client choice).
145 See Taylor, supra note 105, at 590 (suggesting any change in the Model Rules
must be grounded in the interest of protecting the client). See generally Rebecca Anne
Guthrie, Neglecting a Client's Right to Choose Qualified Counsel: UnderDetriment to the
Image of the Legal Profession, 24 J. LEGAL PROF. 411, 412 (1999/2000) (noting that rules
must reflect the client's right to choose counsel); Frances Witty Hamermech, Note, In Defense ofa Double Standardin the Rules of Ethics:A CiticalReevaluation of the Chinese
Wall and Vicarious Disqualification,20 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 245, 253 (1986) (discussing
the interests involved in the client's choice of counsel).
146 See Your ABA: The Score So Far,87 A.B.A-J. 81 (2001) (noting which provisions
suggested by the Commission were accepted and which were rejected); see also Brustin,
supra note 113, at 849 (explaining Rule 1.7). See generallyNathan M. Crystal, Core Values: Falseand True, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 747, 754 (2001) (explaining that when a conflict
arises from personal interests under 1.7 it does not impute to the rest of the firm).
147 See Painter, supra note 45, at 312 (explaining how businesses bargain over the
terms of the waiver); see also Fortney & Hanna, supra note 76, at 676 (indicating that
legal policies and procedures come from business management). See generally Robert
Rubinson, Attorney Fact-finding,Ethical Decision-makingand the Methodology of Law,
45 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1185, 1221 (2001) (noting ethical problems force clients to take their
business elsewhere).
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would address, and if change occurred then prevent, the strategic
use of the legal rules as a settlement producer. Without investigation into how the Code is being manipulated, the Rules of Professional Responsibility and the legal profession will be rendered
the malleable tool of the business world.

